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INTRODUCTIONt
The international and the American compensation systems for
nuclear damage both originated in the early sixties of last century. Both
systems were at the time governed by similar, if not the same, principles.
One of those principles was that a small part of the total compensation was
paid by the nuclear operator, while a much larger part of the total com-
pensation was paid through public funds.' However, the international
and United States' systems of nuclear liability and insurance have since
developed quite differently. The American nuclear compensation system,
based on the Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, originally
adopted in 1957, has been revised approximately every ten years.2 Initially,
the Price-Anderson Act consisted of a two tier system whereby a small part
was covered by the nuclear operator ($60 million) and a much bigger part
of the total compensation ($500 million) was provided for by public funds.3
Since its 1975 revision, the two-tiers system has dramatically changed. The
t We are very grateful to Karine Fiore, Norbert Pelzer and to the participants in the joint
conference of the European Association for Law & Economics (EALE) and the Geneva
Association for the Study of Risk and Insurance (Lecce, June, 15-16, 2007), and in the
seminar at the LSU Law Center (Baton Rouge, Jan. 17, 2008) for useful comments on
earlier drafts. Michael Faure is grateful to the Centre of Civil Law Studies at Louisiana
State University (Baton Rouge) for providing research assistance for this paper. In addi-
tion, we benefited from information provided to us by John Hoffman (AND and Omer F.
Brown (Harmon, Wilmot, Brown & Bagwell, L.L.P) for which we are equally grateful. We
are indebted to Wanchi Tang (Maastricht) and Sally Brown Richardson (LSU) for highly
useful research-assistance. The views reflected in this paper only reflect the personal views
of the authors and is written under their sole responsibility.
1 For an overview of all principles of nuclear liability law, see infra Part I.B.
2Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957).
'Id. at Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4(c), 71 Stat. 576, 577 (1957) (prior to numerous subsequent
amendments).
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individual liability of the operator and the collective tier are financed by all
licensed American nuclear operators through the so-called retrospective
premiums, and thus no longer through public funding.4 In 2005, an im-
portant change to the Price-Anderson Act was adopted whereby the total
amount of compensation reached $10.76 billion.'
Despite the fact that the principles of nuclear liability are quite
similar in the American and international systems, the U.S. was, until
recently, not a member of any of the nuclear liability conventions. How-
ever, on May 21, 2008, the U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification
of the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage ("CSC") at the offices of the International Atomic Energy Agency
("LAEA"). 6 This is an important shift in U.S. policy since it will, as soon as
CSC will enter into force, become a member, for the first time, of the inter-
national nuclear compensation system. Moreover, the Energy Independence
and Security Act of December 19, 2007, provides the way the U.S. will exe-
cute its obligations under the CSC.7 As a result of the Act implementing
the Convention, nuclear suppliers will be obliged to participate in the ret-
rospective risk pooling program to cover the costs of the U.S. contribution
pursuant to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation.'
The nuclear compensation scheme based on the principles of the
international conventions has been subject to much criticism in the legal
literature9 and to some critical economic analysis, as well.' The background
' See Omer F. Brown II, Nuclear Liability Coverage Developments in the United States
of America, in PROCEEDINGS, NUCLEAR INTER JURA '93: BIENNIAL CONGRESS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW ASSOCIATION: NUCLEAR ENERGY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT-THE ROLE OFLAW 11.5.6-1, 4-5 (Associacao Brasileira de Direito Nuclear
ed., 1995) (copy available with the author); Omer F. Brown II, Paper Presented at the
Price-Anderson Contractors Policy Issues Study: Legislative History of Government
Indemnification under the Price-Anderson Act 1-22 (Sept. 1984) (on file with author).
5 See infra Part II.A.3.
6 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, STATUS: CONVENTION ON SUPPLEMENTARY
COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 1 (May 21,2008), available at http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp-status.pdf.
' The Convention on Supplementary Compensation ("CSC") was ratified as part of the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934, 121 Stat. 1492,
1741 (2007); see infra Part II.C.
8Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934(a)(2)(B), 121
Stat. 1492, 1742 (2007).
' See, e.g., Herman Cousy, Een nieuwe vorm van schuldloze aansprakelijkheid:
Aansprakelijkheid voor schade veroorzaakt door het vreedzaam gebruik van kernenergie,
9 JURA FALCONIS 35 (1974) (for Belgium); G.E. van Maanen, Pleidooi voor verbetering van
de rechtspositie van slachtoffers van kernongevallen, 42 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 1342
(1986) (for the Netherlands).
" See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Nuclear Accident
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for this criticism is related to the fact that both the international system
of liability and the compensation due by the nuclear operator to victims
of nuclear accidents are regulated by conventions that originated in the
early 1960s whose principles have not particularly changed.
One can therefore notice that today the U.S. compensation scheme,
as instituted by the amended Price-Anderson Act, has features that dis-
tinguish it from the international regime. Notwithstanding recent changes
in the international regime, the total amount of compensation in the Price-
Anderson scheme is, as we shall demonstrate in this paper, substantially
higher than under the international regime. Substantial amounts can be
raised for compensation in the U.S. scheme through retrospective pre-
miums. Moreover, in the U.S. scheme, the liability is not-as it is in the
international regime-exclusively channelled to the nuclear operator."'
Another important element is the different evolution of the two
compensation schemes. Where the U.S. phased out all public funding, the
international regime reaffirmed, and even increased, public funding under
the nuclear liability conventions created in response to the Chernobyl acci-
dent. As a result, the U.S. compensation scheme seems to be financed at
a larger scale through market participants rather than through public
funding. However, under both systems the liability of the nuclear operator
is limited, even when including countries like Germany, Switzerland, and
Japan, that have introduced an unlimited liability for the nuclear operator.
Previously, scholars argued that substantially higher amounts of
compensation could be provided through a pooling of nuclear operators. 2
This idea recently received support from an international authority in the
area of nuclear law.'3 Interestingly, to some extent, such a pooling system
exists in the U.S. where the mutual insurance scheme of the nuclear oper-
ators is complementary to the traditional nuclear insurance pool.
Given the fact that some scholars have suggested that the regime
of the Price-Anderson Act would to some extent be more efficient than the
Law, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1997).
1, For a more detailed discussion of these differences, see infra Parts III & IV.
12 Michael G. Faure & Gran Skogh, Compensation for Damages Caused by Nuclear
Accidents: A Convention as Insurance, 17 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE
499,509 (1992); Jean-Robert Tyran & Peter Zweifel, Environmental Risk Internalization
Through Capital Markets (ERICAM): The Case of Nuclear Power, 13 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 431, 434 (1993).
'" Norbert Pelzer, International Pooling of Operators' Funds: An Option to Increase the
Amount of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liability?, 79 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 37, 46
(2007).
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compensation regime in the international regime, we would like to submit
the Price-Anderson Act and its recent changes to an economic analysis. The
goal of this paper is therefore to examine, using the tools of the economic
analysis of law, whether the liability and insurance regime installed by
the Price-Anderson Act shows less of the inefficiencies than the interna-
tional regime.14 The crucial question in that respect is, of course, whether
the parties who are involved in creating the nuclear risk, operators and
others, such as nuclear suppliers, are exposed to the social costs created
by their activities.
There are also several other reasons to look more closely at the
compensation regime for damages caused by nuclear accidents and com-
pare the Price-Anderson Act with the international regime. First, the in-
ternational regime of the Nuclear Energy Agency ("NEA") suffers from
a serious problem, as an increase of the liability of the nuclear operator
to E700 million ($1.112 billion), as agreed upon in 2004, is not yet in force
as of July 2008.'" One of the reasons is that nuclear operators apparently
failed to obtain insurance coverage for this substantial amount." This
merits the question of how the Price-Anderson regime can generate sub-
stantially larger amounts of coverage than the international regime and
not suffer from similar insurance problems. Second, the U.S. has for the
first time ratified an international convention related to nuclear liability
and compensation-the CSC.17 This merits analyzing the consequences
of this change in U.S. policy towards the international nuclear liability
conventions. Third, after September 11, 2001, everyone realizes that
nuclear installations can also be subject to terrorist attacks.'" Although,
as we will show below, terrorism is not excluded from the international
14 Our focus will be more specifically on the international conventions of the Nuclear
Energy Agency ("NEA"). See infra Part I.A.
is Council Decision (EC) No. 294/2004 of 8 Mar. 2004, art. 2(1), 2004 O.J. (L 97) 53, 54.
Despite an European Union ("EU") Council Decision on March 8,2004, in which Member
States which are a party to the Paris Convention were urged to ratify these changes
within a reasonable time and, if possible, before December 31, 2006. Id.
" Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, The Civil Liability of European Nuclear Operators:
Which Coverage for the New 2004 Protocols?-Evidence from France, 8 INTL ENVTL.
AGREEMENTS 227, 234-38 (2008).
17 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934 (2007).
" See, e.g., Mark Holt, Summary to CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ("CRS") REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, Nuclear Energy Policy (2007); Matthew L. Wald, N.R.C. Excludes Terrorism as
a Licensing Consideration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at All (highlighting the fact that
public hearings on terror risk would provide too much information about the vulnerability
of nuclear installations).
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regime,19 the question arises whether sufficient compensation is avail-
able under international conventions or the Price-Anderson Act if, as a
result of a terrorist attack, a nuclear accident takes place. Fourth, all of
these questions merit further research now that nuclear energy has re-
gained popularity as an alternative to fossil fuel in an attempt to reduce
carbon dioxide ("C0 2") emissions. 20 That nuclear alternative may, how-
ever, only be economically viable in the long run if nuclear operators are
able to internalize the social costs created by their activities.2 In other
words, nuclear operators must be able to provide full compensation in case
of a nuclear accident.
The issue of the social costs of the nuclear liability scheme is far
from a theoretical discussion. Indeed, the European Commission presented
its energy package on January 10, 2007 entitled "An Energy Policy for
Europe."22 In the different documents presented, the European Commission
rightly noted the huge challenges Europe is facing in terms of climate
change, security of supply, and liberalization of the electricity and gas
market.23 On the future of nuclear energy, the Commission stated that
nuclear energy is one of the ways of limiting CO 2 emissions and that nu-
clear energy is likely to form part of the energy policy in several Member
States. 24 In the U.S., there also appears to be a renewed interest in nuclear
energy given that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") has already
extended the lifetime of sixteen nuclear power plants by twenty years,
thus enabling those reactors to be in operation for sixty, instead of forty
" See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.20 See MARK HOLT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NuCLEAR ENERGY POLICY 6 (July 12, 2007)
(stating that climate change is an import reason for renewed interest in nuclear energy);
see also, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, THE FUTURE OF NucLEAR POWER: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 78-79 (2003), available at http'/web.mit.edu/nuclearpower.
2 See Richard L. Garwin, Senior Fellow for Science and Technology, Council on Foreign
Relations, Presentation at the Nuclear Control Institute (Apr. 9,2001), available at http'/
www.fas.org/rlg/010409-nci.htm (recommending the internalization of costs to ensure the
future viability of nuclear energy); Cindy Folkers, Price-Anderson Act: Unnecessary &
Irresponsible, Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Oct. 2001, http://www.nirs.org/
factsheets/priceandersonactfactsheetlOOl.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2008) ("every nuclear
power plant designer, supplier and operator should be required to internalize the insur-
ance costs to the full extent of the risks and consequences associated with splitting the
atom to create electricity.").
22 Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European
Parliament, An Energy Policy for Europe, COM (2007) 1 final (Jan. 10, 2007).
23Id. at 3-5.
24Id. at 17-18.
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years.25 Similarly, in October 2008, thirteen applications were under
review and twenty-two were due to submit license renewal.26 Moreover,
significant initiatives for new commercial reactors are included in the
Energy Policy Act of 200527 and the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007.28 President Bush said at the signing of the latter, "[i]f we're
serious about making sure we grow our economy and deal with green-
house gases, we have got to expand nuclear power."2 9 It is not in our inten-
tion to comment on these policy issues. However, it is relevant to point out
some of the economic consequences of the use of nuclear power, certainly
in view of the "competition," both in Europe and in the U.S., between
nuclear energy and other energy sources, including renewable energy
sources. The goal of this paper is to address the issue of nuclear liability
and insurance from an economic perspective. A normative implication,
or policy relevance, of this examination is that we will also address the
question of to what extent the liability (Price-Anderson Act) and insur-
ance system that is in place in the U.S. may constitute a valuable alter-
native to be considered for the international regime.
With this purpose in mind, our paper is structured in the following
format. After our introduction, we will analyze the nuclear liability con-
ventions, both those of the first and second generation in Section I. In
Section II, we will sketch the structure of the compensation regime in the
Price-Anderson Act. In that respect, we will pay more attention to the
2005 changes in the Price-Anderson Act and to the 2007 ratification of the
CSC. Within Section III, we will discuss the manner in which nuclear
risk is insured. Given the complexity of both the U.S. and international
systems, we will provide some examples in Section IV of how the systems
work in case of a nuclear accident. Understanding how the systems work
25 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, 2008-2009 INFORMATION DIGEST 98-112
(2009), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/srl 3 50/
v20/sr1350v20.pdf (listing the license issue and expiration dates for each of the 104 reac-
tors in the U.S.). See generally U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMm'N (NRC), BACKGROUNDER:
REACTOR LICENSE RENEWAL 1 (2007), available at www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/
renewal.html.26 U.S. NRC, Status ofLicense Renewal Applications and Industry Activities, http'J/www.nrc
.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).27 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 641-45, 119 Stat. 594, 794-99 (2005).
21 See Ann MacLachlan, U.S. Ratification Boosts Plan for International Nuclear Liability,
49 NUCLEONICS WEEK, Jan. 3, 2008, at 6 (discussing the positive effects of the CSC).
' President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of H.R. 6, the Energy Independence
and Security Act of 2007 (Dec. 19, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071219-6.html).
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in case of a nuclear accident is important to comprehending the subse-
quent economic analysis. Section V will provide an economic analysis of
the U.S. liability and insurance regime, addressing to what extent the Price-
Anderson Act enables incentives to be provided to the parties involved in
the nuclear risk and addresses the financing of the compensation scheme.
Using this economic framework, we will then compare the main
features of the U.S. system-in the light of economic analysis-with the
current international regime and analyze the comparative efficiency of
both schemes in Section VI. A few obvious policy conclusions from the eco-
nomic analysis of the U.S. system for the international regime will thus
be presented. The paper concludes in the last section.
I. COMPENSATION OF NUCLEAR DAMAGE ON THE BASIS OF THE
NUCLEAR LIABILITY CONVENTIONS
We will explain the international nuclear liability regime by first
giving an overview of all the different conventions. After that we will
analyse the principles of the nuclear liability conventions.
A. Overview
At the beginning of the development of private nuclear industry,
two international regimes regulated the civil liability for damage caused
by nuclear accidents, i.e., the regimes created compensation mechanisms
for nuclear damage.3 ° The first treaty regime was established under the
auspices of the OECD NEA and consists of the Convention on Third Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of July 29, 1960 ("The Paris
Convention") and the Brussels Supplementary Convention to the Paris
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of
January 31, 1963 ("The Brussels Supplementary Convention").3 The Paris
Convention introduced the major principles of the international nuclear
liability conventions.32 The Brussels Supplementary Convention provided
for additional compensation of damages in case the coverage of the oper-
ator under the Paris Convention was inadequate or insufficient.33
30 See generally NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR NUCLEAR
DAMAGE: AN INTERNATIONAL OvERvIEw (OECD, 1994).
3 Id. at 11.
32/Id.
' See id. Both the Paris and Brussels Supplementary Conventions have been supple-
mented by a few additional protocols. The Protocol to the Paris Convention of November 16,
226 [Vol. 33:219
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The second nuclear liability treaty regime was developed under
the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"): the Vienna
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of May 21, 1963 ("the
Vienna Convention"). a The Vienna Convention, as does the Paris Conven-
tion, introduces five major principles of international nuclear liability law."
The NEA treaty regime is regionally confined (i.e., Western Europe,
Slovenia and Turkey),36 while the IAEA treaty regime is worldwide in
scope.37
There were no significant changes to the different nuclear liabil-
ity treaties until after the Chernobyl accident on April 26, 1986. s The
accident triggered a revision process for both the NEA and IAEA regimes,
resulting in the adoption, on three different dates, of several new inter-
national conventions.39 It is too much of a digression to discuss all of these
changes within this paper.4"
1982 adjusts some of the definitions and imposes liability on the operator for damage to
the means of transport. The Protocol to the Paris Convention of November 16, 1982
changes the unit of account into SDR (Special Drawing Rights) and increases the liability
amounts in each of the three tiers from 120 million in the first tier up to 300 million SDRs
in the third. Although the basic text is always that of the Paris Convention, when re-
ferred to, it will include the additional protocols as well. See M. Lagorce, Bilan etAnalyse
Critique de la Convention de Paris et de la Convention Complementaire de Bruxelles apr~s
les Protocoles de 1982, in NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY INSURANCE: STATUS AND
PROSPECTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE MUNICH SYMPOSIUM: 10-14TH SEPTEMBER 1984 24-41
(NEA-IAEA, 1985).
3 See International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage, IiNFCIRC/500 20 Mar. 1996, httpJ/www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Infcircs/1996/inf500.shtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].35 
Id.
31 See Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, Latest
Status of Ratifications or Accessions, http'//www.nea.fr/htmlAaw/paris-convention-ratification
.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).37 See INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, VIENNA CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY
FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE, REGISTRATION No: 1277 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.iaea.
org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability-status.pdf.
3 See Julia A. Schwartz, International Nuclear Third Party Liability Law: The Response
to Chernobyl, in INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL PERIOD 41-44
(OECD-NEA, 2006); Foreword to INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LAW IN THE POST-CHERNOBYL
PERIOD 3 (OECD-NEA, 2006).
" See Schwartz, supra note 38, at 44-57. After the Chernobyl accident several conventions
concerning nuclear safety issues have been adopted as well. See Odette Jankowitsch-
Prevor, The Convention on Nuclear Safety, in INTERNATIONALNUCLEAR LAW INTHE POST-
CHERNOBYL PERIOD 155-68 (OECD-NEA, 2006). In this paper, we only discuss the inter-
national conventions dealing with nuclear liability and compensation.
4 For a detailed discussion, see Tom Vanden Borre, Shifts in Governance in Compen-
sation for Nuclear Damage, 20 Years after Chernobyl, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION FOR
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For our purposes, it is important to mention that the first result
was the 1988 adoption of the Joint Protocol between the Paris and Vienna
Convention, basically linking the territorial scope of both conventions.4'
The second result, two new legal instruments were adopted into the IAEA
regime on September 12, 1997: the Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna
Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage ("the Protocol to the
Vienna Convention")4 2 and CSC.43 Where the Protocol to the Vienna
Convention--quite logically-modifies the Vienna Convention, the CSC
is an independent "stand-alone" convention, since any country can join
the Convention without having to be a party to either the Paris or the
Vienna Convention."
Finally, the revision process of the NEA regime also resulted in the
opening for signature of two new instruments on February 12, 2004: the
Protocol to amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy of July 29,1960 ("the Protocol to the Paris Convention")' and
the Protocol to amend the Convention of January 31, 1963 supplementary to
the Convention of July 29, 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy ("the Protocol to the Brussels Supplementary Convention").'
In order to make the distinction between the different treaties,
it is useful to distinguish between the nuclear international liability
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 261-309 (Michael Faure & Albert Verheij, eds., 2007); Chlo6e
Degros, La Responsabilitg Civile Nucldaire: un dtat des lieux, Rapport belge, in LES
RESPONSABILITPS ENVIRONNEMENTALES DANS LESPACE EUROPt EN: POINT DE VUE FRANCO-
BELGE 303 (G. Viney & B. Dubuisson, eds., 2006); Schwartz, supra note 38, at 37-72;
Ronald Dussart Desart, The Reform of the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in
the Field of Nuclear Energy and of the Brussels Supplementary Convention: An Overview
of the Main Features of the Modernisation of the two Conventions, 75 NUCLEAR L. BULL.
7-33 (2005).
41 NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 30, at 94-96.4 2 International Atomic Energy Agency, Protocol to Amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1997), available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Conventions/protamend.html.
43 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, CONVENTION ON SUPPLEMENTARY COMPEN-
SATION FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE, IAEA DOC. INFCIRC/567 para. 1 (998), available at httpJ/
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1998/infcirc567.pdf [hereinafter CSC].
"Id. at art. XVI ("This Convention shall be open for signature, by all states... "(emphasis
added)).
" Nuclear Energy Agency, 2004 Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, httpj/www.nea
.fr/html/law/paris-convention-protocol.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
"Nuclear Energy Agency, 2004 Protocol to Amend the Brussels Supplementary Convention
on Nuclear Third Party Liability, httpJ/www.nea.fr/html/law/brussels-supplementary-
convention-protocol.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
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regime of the first generation on the one hand-the Paris Convention,
the Brussels Supplementary Convention and the Vienna Convention-
and the nuclear international liability regime of the second generation
on the other hand-all the later Conventions and Protocols. The conven-
tions of the first generation are those that came into being in the early
1960s at the birth of the Nuclear Era, while the conventions of the second
generation were introduced after the Chernobyl accident. The nuclear
liability conventions of the first generation consisted of three conventions,
the nuclear liability conventions of the second generation added five more
treaties. Thus, as a result of the revision process, the international nuclear
compensation system consists of no less than eight international conven-
tions. Table 1 gives an overview of the different conventions.
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR LIABILITY
CONVENTIONS
Overview of the International Nuclear Liability Conventions
NEA regime Paris Convention on Protocol to amend the
Third Party Liability in Convention on Third Party
the Field of Nuclear Liability in the Field of
Energy of July 29, 1960 Nuclear Energy of July 29,
1960 of February 12, 2004
Brussels Supplementary Protocol to amend the
Convention to the Paris Convention of January 31,
Convention on Third 1963 supplementary to the
Party Liability in the Convention of July 29, 1960 on
Field of Nuclear Energy Third Party Liability in the
of January 31, 1963 Field of Nuclear Energy of
February 12, 2004
IAEA regime Vienna Convention on Protocol to Amend the 1963
Civil Liability for Vienna Convention on Civil
Nuclear Damage of Liability for Nuclear Damage
May 21, 1963 of September 12, 1997
Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear
Damage of September 12, 1997
NEA & IAEA Joint Protocol Relating to the
Application of the Vienna
Convention and the Paris
Convention of September 21,
1988
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Several of the discussed protocols and conventions of the second
generation have not entered into force yet. The Protocol to the Vienna
Convention entered into force on October 4, 2003, but only had limited
success-only five countries were members in mid-2008.47 The CSC was
even more limited since it was not yet in force as of October 2008. Only
four countries have ratified the Convention, including the United States.'
The Protocol to the Paris Convention and the Protocol to the Brussels
Supplementary Convention were opened for signature on February 12,
2004, but as of July 2008 neither of these instruments had entered into
force.49 Table 2 outlines the entry into force provisions of all the second
generation protocols.
TABLE 2: OVERVIEW OF ENTRY INTO FORCE PROVISIONS
Overview of Entry into Force Provisions
Convention Article Content
Protocol to the S(b) This Convention shall come into force upon
Paris Convention the deposit of instruments of ratification,
acceptance or approval by not less than five
of the Signatories. For each Signatory ratify-
ing, accepting or approving thereafter, this
Convention shall come into force upon the
deposit of its instrument of ratification,
acceptance or approval.
Protocol to the Article 20 c) c) This Convention shall come into force three
Brussels & d) months after the deposit of the sixth instru-
Supplementary ment of ratification, acceptance or approval.
Convention d) For each Signatory ratifying, accepting or
approving this Convention after the deposit of
the sixth instrument of ratification, acceptance
or approval, it shall come into force three
months after the date of the deposit of its
instrument of ratification, acceptance or
approval.
47These countries are Argentina, Belarus, Latvia, Morocco, and Romania. INTERNATIONAL
ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, PROTOCOL TO AMEND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY
FOR NuCLEAR DAMAGE, REGISTRATION No. 1759 1 (Jul. 4, 2003), available at http://www
.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/protamend-status.pdf.
48 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 6.49Nuclear Energy Agency, Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability: Latest status
of ratifications or accessions, http://www.nea.fr/html/law/paris-convention-ratification
.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008); Nuclear Energy Agency, Brussels Supplementary
Convention: Latest Status of Ratifications or Accessions, http'//www.nea.fr/html/law/
brussels-convention-ratification.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008).
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Protocol to the Article 21 1) 1) This Protocol shall enter into force three
Vienna Convention & 2) months after the date of deposit of the fifth
instrument of ratification, acceptance or
approval.
2) For each State ratifying, accepting, approving
or acceding to this Protocol after the deposit of
the fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance
or approval, this Protocol shall enter into force
three months after the date of deposit by such
State of the appropriate instrument.
Convention on Article XX 1) This Convention shall come into force on
Supplementary 1) & 2) the ninetieth day following the date on which
Compensation at least 5 States with a minimum of 400,000
units of installed nuclear capacity have
deposited an instrument referred to in
Article XVIII.
2) For each State which subsequently ratifies,
accepts, approves or accedes to this Convention,
it shall enter into force on the ninetieth day
after deposit by such State of the appropriate
instrument.
It is important to mention that even though the U.S. has histori-
cally had an important influence on the coming into being of the interna-
tional conventions, the U.S. itself was until recently not a party to any
of the above mentioned nuclear liability conventions. As already men-
tioned, the U.S. ratified the CSC and thus, as soon as this convention will
enter into force, the U.S. will be part of the international nuclear liability
system. One can expect that U.S. adherence to the CSC might be an argu-
ment for other countries to join the CSC as well, leading to the CSC's
entry into force. 0
The U.S. was not the only country operating outside the interna-
tional nuclear liability system. Indeed, adherence to both the NEA and
IAEA international nuclear liability conventions, and thus to the inter-
national nuclear compensation scheme, is far from general. McRae calcu-
lated that of the ten countries with the largest installed nuclear capacity,
only one-half are members of the international scheme.5' Overall, the
5o For example, U.S. adherence might cause Japan to join the CSC. Japan's ratification
would trigger the CSC's entry into force.
51 See Ben McRae, Overview of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation, in REFORM
OF CIViL NUCLEAR LIABILITY INTERNATIONAL SYMPOsIUM, BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, 31 MAY-3
JUNE 1999 171, 175 (OECD, 2000). These countries are Canada, France, Germany, Japan,
the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. Id. Members of the international scheme include France, Germany,
Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Id.
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nuclear power-generating countries that operate outside the interna-
tional compensation regimes account for more than half of worldwide in-
stalled capacity. 5 2 Several nuclear power-generating countries operating
outside the international compensation system have, however, adopted
principles into their domestic liability law that are similar to the princi-
ples of the international conventions. In this paper, we only address the
national nuclear liability system of the U.S., given the interesting evo-
lution of the American nuclear liability and insurance scheme.
Some of the differences between the regime of the international
conventions and the U.S. national scheme will be highlighted below. Be-
fore doing so, we will first briefly identify the main principles underlying
the international conventions.53
B. Principles Underlying The International Nuclear Liability
Conventions
The compensation regime introduced in the Paris and Vienna
conventions is based upon a variety of principles: strict liability, legal
channelling of the liability to the nuclear operator, limitation of liability,
compulsory insurance and exclusive jurisdiction of one court.54
According to Article 3 of the Paris Convention:
the operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable.., for
(i) damage to or loss of life of any person; and (ii) damage
to or loss of any property other than (1) the nuclear instal-
lation itself and any other nuclear installation, including
52Id. Also, non-nuclear power generating countries feel reluctant to join either the Paris
or Vienna Convention because, in their view, these Conventions do not sufficiently
address the concerns of the victims of a nuclear accident. Id.53 Again, we should reiterate that within the scope of this paper, we only briefly mention
the main principles of the conventions, more particularly those which we find important
for our subsequent economic analysis. For deeper analysis fo the principles, see Michael
G. Faure, Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Caused by Nuclear Accidents:
Some Lessons for the Revision of the Paris and Vienna Conventions, 2 EUR. J. L. & ECON.
21 (1995).
' For a discussion of the first four principles, see id. at 24-26. This fifth principle-
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the contracting party in whose territory the nuclear
incident occurred, art. 13(a) of the Paris Convention-will remain undiscussed because
it is less relevant for the economic analysis in this paper. Given the similiary of the provi-
sions in Paris and Vienna Conventions, the analyses hereunder will focus on the provisions
of the Paris Convention.
[Vol. 33:219232
COMPENSATING NUCLEAR DAMAGE
a nuclear installation under construction, on the site where
that installation is located; and (2) any property on that
same site which is used or to be used in connection with
any such installation.55
This liability is established "upon proof that such damage or loss was
caused by a nuclear accident in such installation or involving nuclear sub-
stances coming from such installation.... "56 Thus, a victim wanting to
introduce a claim against a nuclear operator does not have to prove a
fault committed by the operator. This type of liability is generally known
as strict liability.
According to Article 9 of the Paris Convention:
The nuclear operator shall not be liable for damage caused
by a nuclear incident directly due to an act of armed con-
flict, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or, except in so far as
the legislation of the Contracting Party in whose territory
his nuclear installation is situated may provide to the con-
trary, a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.57
The Expos6 des Motifs of the Paris Convention uses the words "absolute
liability" since the nuclear operator will not be able to escape from liability
using "classic exonerations such as force majeure, acts of God or inter-
vening acts of third persons, whether or not such acts were reasonably
foreseeable and avoidable."58
The only exonerations lie in the case of damage caused by
a nuclear incident directly due to certain disturbances of
an international character such as acts of armed conflict
and hostilities, of a political nature such as civil war and
insurrection, or grave natural disasters of an exceptional
55 Nuclear Energy Agency, Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear
Energy of 29th July 1960 as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1975
and by the Protocol of 16th November 1982, art. 3(a), available at http://www.nea.fr/html/
law/nlparis-conv.html [hereinafter Paris Convention].
56 Id. art. 3(a).
5 7Id. art. 9.
' Nuclear Energy Agency, Expos6 des Motifs, Revised text of the Expos6 des Motifs of
the Paris Convention, approved by the OECD Council on the 16th November 1982, para.
48, http'//www.nea.fr/html/law/nlparis-motif.html, para. 48 (last visited Sept. 28, 2008)
[hereinafter Expos6 des Motifs].
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character, which are catastrophic and completely unfore-
seeable, on the grounds that all such matters are the re-
sponsibility of the nation as a whole. 9
The nuclear operator, therefore, is liable for damage caused by acts of
terrorism.6"
Article 6 of the Paris Convention introduces the principle of chan-
nelling liability to the nuclear operator.6' This channelling has two impli-
cations: first, in case of a nuclear accident as defined pursuant to the Paris
Convention, only the operator can be held liable under the conditions of
the Paris Convention and, second, no one else but the operator is liable
as the operator does not, in principle, have any right of recourse.62 This
means that the Paris Convention constitutes the only legal basis for vic-
tims to claim compensation for damage suffered as a result of a nuclear
accident, excluding other legal provisions, especially those based on gen-
eral tort law. Due to the exclusion of any other basis for a liability claim,
victims of nuclear incidents may only sue the nuclear operator.63 This type
of liability is also referred to as "exclusive liability."64
According to Article 7 of the Paris Convention, the maximum liabil-
ity of the operator in respect of damage caused by a nuclear accident shall
be 15 million Special Drawing Rights ("SDRs"), '15.518 million or $24.654
million.65 Article 7 of the Paris Convention allows for "any Contracting
Party taking into account the possibilities for the operator obtaining the
insurance or other financial security required pursuant to Article 10 may
59/d.
o See Nathalie L.J.T. Horbach, Omer F. Brown II & Tom Vanden Borre, Terrorism and
Nuclear Damage Coverage, 20 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES L. 231 (2002).
61 Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 6 states: "The right to compensation for damage
caused by a nuclear incident may be exercised only against an operator liable for the
damage in accordance with this Convention .... Except as otherwise provided in this
Article, no other person shall be liable for damage caused by a nuclear incident .... "
" Id.; see id. at art. 1(a) (defining operator "as the person designated or recognised by the
competent authorities as the operator of a nuclear installation.").
6 For a more detailed discussion, see Norbert Pelzer, Channelling: Concept and Policy
under the Paris and the Vienna Conventions, in JOINT CECAIAEA/NEA, TRAINING SEMINAR
ON NUCLEAR LAW BRATISLAVA, AUGUST 30-SEPT. 2,1994 2-11 (1994) (on file with author).
4 Schwartz, supra note 38, at 40.
65 See Paris Convention, supra note 55, art. 7(b). The exact value of the SDR is determined
by the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"). Id. For this article, we used the exchange
rate of July 16, 2008: 1 SDR = 41.034500 = $1.643610. International Monetary Fund,
Currency units per SDR for July 2008, http:/www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rmsmth
.aspx?SelectDate=2008-07-31&reportType=CVSDR (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
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establish by legislation a greater or lesser amount .... . In no event,
however, shall any amounts so established be less than 5 million SDR,
465.173 million or $8.218 million.6" The limitation of liability was consid-
ered to be necessary in order to not obstruct the development of nuclear
industry. The Exposg des Motifs explains that "unlimited liability could
easily lead to the ruin of the operator without affording any substantial con-
tribution to compensation for the damage caused."8 The reason for this
limitation was purely economic: the liability of the operator was limited to
the amount for which the insurance market was able to provide coverage.6"
The operator's liability is also subject to a time limit. According to
Article 8 of the Paris Convention, the victim's right to compensation is
"extinguished if an action is not brought within ten years from the date of
the nuclear incident." ° The Contracting Parties, nevertheless, have the
option to establish a period longer than ten years, provided that the opera-
tor's liability is covered by insurance or some other financial guarantee.71
The 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention of the NEA adds
two other layers of publicly available funds to this liability regime. Accord-
ing to Article 3 of the Brussels Supplementary Convention, "the Contract-
ing Parties undertake that compensation in respect of the damage...
[caused by a nuclear accident] shall be provided up to the amount of 300
million Special Drawing Rights per incident" (46310.350 million or $493.083
million).72
66 Paris Convention, supra note 55, at art. 7(b)(i).
67 See id. at art. 7(b). It is striking that, according to the wording of Art. 7 of the Paris
Convention, a maximum liability can be considered to have been introduced. In practice,
many countries did not implement this provision too strictly-either imposing a higher
amount of liability (e.g., in Belgium an amount of 4 300 million) or introducing a system
of unlimited liability (Germany). GARY S. URIccHIo, AMERICAN NUCLEAR INSURERS,
NucLEAR LIABILITY OUTSIDE THE U.S. 3 (Apr. 2008) (for Belgium); World Nuclear
Association, Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/infr67.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2008) (for Germany). Thus, contrary to
a strict reading of Art. 7 of the Paris Convention, several Contracting Parties took the
liberty of going beyond the "maximum limit" of 15 million SDRs. The liability limit under
the Vienna Convention is $5 million minimum. Vienna Convention, supra note 34, at art.
V(1).
' Exposg des Motifs, supra note 58, at para. 45.69 NORBERT PELZER, BEGRENZTE UND UNBEGRENZTE HAFTUNG IM DEUTSCHEN ATOMRECHT
13 (Nomos 1982).
70 Paris Convention, supra note 55, at art. 8(a).
71 Id.
72Nuclear Energy Agency, Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris
Convention of 29th July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January
1964 and by the Protocol of 16th November 1982, art. 3(a), available at http://www.nea.fr/
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Such compensation shall be provided:
i) up to an amount of at least 5 million Special Drawing
Rights [E5.173 million, $8.218 million], out of funds pro-
vided by insurance or other financial security, such amount
to be established by the legislation of the Contracting Party
in whose territory the nuclear installation of the operator
liable is situated;
ii) between this amount and 175 million Special Drawing
Rights [170 SDRs = E175.865 million = $279.414 million],
out of public funds to be made available by the Contract-
ing Party in whose territory the nuclear installation of the
operator liable is situated;
iii) between 175 and 300 million Special Drawing Rights
[125 million SDRs = E129.313 million = $205.451 million],
out of public funds to be made available by the Contract-
ing Parties according to a formula for contributions...
[which is based on the GNP and the thermal capacity of
the reactors]."
The 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention, thus, introduces two
additional tiers of compensation for covering nuclear damage in addition
to the first tier of private funds provided for by the Paris Convention.74
The two additional tiers of public funds include one "national" public fund
to be made available by the Installation State and one international soli-
darity fund to be made available by all Contracting Parties.75
In the NEA regime, the Protocol to the Paris Convention of 2004
introduces a new liability limit in the Paris Convention. According to the
new Article 7 of the Paris Convention, "[e]ach Contracting Party shall
html/law/nlbrussels.html [hereinafter Brussels Supplementary Convention].731 Id. at art. 3(b).
7 See id.75 See id., at art. 3(b)-(c). However, the Installation State can escape from its obligation to
make national public funds available. Under the Brussels Supplementary Convention,
each Contracting Party has indeed a certain freedom. It can either establish the maximum
liability of the operator, pursuant to the Paris Convention, at 300 million SDRs, and pro-
vide that such liability shall be covered by the insurance of the nuclear operator (in that
case the Installation State has met its obligation under the Convention and must not pro-
vide for national public funding). Id. Or, the Contracting Party can also set the maximum
liability of the operator at an amount at least equal to the insurance of the nuclear oper-
ator and provide that, in excess of such amount and up to 300 million SDRs, public funds
shall be made available by some means other than as cover for the liability of the operator.
Id. For more details, see Vanden Borre, supra note 40.
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provide under its legislation that the liability of the operator in respect
of nuclear damage caused by any one nuclear incident shall not be less
than 700 million euros" ($1.112 billion).76 According to the Protocol to the
Brussels Supplementary Convention the Contracting Parties shall "under-
take that compensation in respect of nuclear damage.., shall be pro-
vided up to an amount of 1 500 million euro [$2.383 billion] per nuclear
incident .... , ' The public compensation will be divided as follows:
i) up to an amount of at least 700 million euro [$1.112 bil-
lion] funds provided by insurance or other financial secu-
rity or out of public funds provided pursuant to Art. 10(c) of
the Paris Convention... ;
ii) between [this amount] and 1 200 million euro [K500
million; $794.40 million] public funds to be made available
by the Contracting Party in whose territory the nuclear
installation of the operator liable is situated;
iii) between 1 200 million euro and 1 500 million euro
[C300 million; $476.64 million] out of public funds to be
made available by the Contracting Parties according to
the formula for contributions .....
Two other important changes to the Paris Convention must also
be mentioned. First, Article I(B) of the Protocol to the Paris Convention
changes the definition of nuclear damage. This will include not only per-
sonal injury claims and property damage claims, but also, to the extent
determined by the law of the court with jurisdiction, economic loss arising
from loss or damage, the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired
environment, loss of income deriving from a direct economic interest in
any use or enjoyment of the environment, and the costs of preventive mea-
sures.79 Second, Article 8 of the Paris Convention is being modified so that
76 Nuclear Energy Agency, Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability
in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of
28 January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16 November 1982, February 12, 2004, art. H(a)
[hereinafter the Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention].
77 Nuclear EnergyAgency, Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supple-
mentary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, as amended by the additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the
Protocol of 16 November 1982, February 12,2004, art. C [hereinafter the Protocol to Amend
the Brussels Supplementary Convention].
78 Id.
79See Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, supra note 76, at art. B.
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with respect to loss of life and personal injury, the nuclear operator will
be liable for thirty years from the date of the nuclear accident, while ten
years will remain the limit for other nuclear damage.8 ° It should be noted
that the Protocol to the Vienna Conventions of 1997 provides for similar,
if not identical, changes.8'
To cover his liability, the operator is required to have and maintain
insurance or other financial security for the amount of his liability and of
such type and terms as the competent public authority shall specify. 2 This
financial security may be in the form of conventional financial guarantees
or ordinary liquid assets, insurance coverage or other. A combination of
insurance, other financial security and State guarantee may be accepted.
Finally, the CSC, adopted on September 12, 1997, is a new and in-
dependent legal instrument, which means that a state does not need to be
party to the Vienna or Paris Conventions in order to become a party to
the CSC.83 According to CSC Art. III(1)(a)(i), "the Installation State shall
ensure the availability of [at least] 300 million SDRs [E310.350 million,
$493.083 million] .... "84 The Installation State is free to choose how
this amount is funded (private insurance, regional agreement, etc.). A
State meets its obligation under Article III(1)(a) of the CSC when it
imposes a nuclear liability on the operator for the entire amount.8 5 Thus,
this Article does not oblige a State to make public funds available.
However, according to Article III(1)(B) of the CSC, the Contracting
Parties shall, beyond the amount available under the first tier, make public
funds available.86 Basically, this formula provides the basis for an inter-
national fund of approximately 300 million SDRs if all countries having
nuclear power plants on their territory become members to the CSC.17
80 See id. at art. I(a).
See Protocol to Amend Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA
Doc. INFCIRC/566, Sept. 29, 1997, art. 8, available at http://www.iaea.orgfPublications/
Documents/Conventions/protamend.html [hereinafter Protocol to amend the Vienna
Convention].
82 See Paris Convention, supra note 55, at art. 10(a); see also Protocol to Amend the Paris
Convention, supra note 76, at art. K(a).
CSC, supra note 43, at arts. XVIII-XIX.
Id. at art. III(a)(i).
See id at art. 111(4) ("The interest and costs awarded by a court in actions for compen-
sation of nuclear damage are payable... and shall be proportionate to the actual con-
tributions made.., by the operator liable.. .
See id. at art. III(I)(b).87See id. at art. IV(1)(a); McRae, supra note 51, at 176.
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The admittedly rather complicated8" evolution of the nuclear com-
pensation regime is summarized in Table 3.
TABLE 3: AVAILABLE AMOUNTS OF COMPENSATION
Amount in Millions (USD)
Convention Contributor First Second
Generation Generation
Paris Nuclear operator $8.218 $1,112
Convention
Brussels Installation State $279.414 $794.40
Supplementary (or nuclear
Convention operator)
Collective State $205.451 $476.64
Fund
Total NEA $493.083 $2,383
regime
Vienna Nuclear operator $5.000 $246.542
Convention
Collective State - $246.542
Fund
Total Vienna $5.000 $493.083
Convention
CSC Operator/ $493.083
Installation State
Collective State $493.083
Fund
Total CSC $986.166
The important lesson from Table 3 is the varied growth in com-
pensation across the regimes. Under the second generation NEA regime,
once this will be in force, total compensation of E1.5 billion ($2.383 billion)
' Nathalie L.J.T. Horbach, Lacunae of International Nuclear Liability Agreements, in
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY LAW: HARMONISING LEGISLATION IN
CEEC/NIS 81-85 (Natalie L.J.T. Horbach ed., 1999) (discussing how one can indeed hold
that there is a labyrinth of international conventions dealing with nuclear liability issues).
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will be available, of which 1700 million ($1.112 billion) will be financed by
the operator, as compared to the 1963 total of only 6356 million ($565.61
million). The total amount available under the Vienna Convention is, as
the table clearly shows, nearly equal to the amount which was set by the
Brussels supplementary Convention in 1963. The public funding compo-
nent of the nuclear compensation mechanism of the second generation
is either newly created or has been kept at the same relative level as the
1963 level.8 9 In absolute terms, there is considerably more public funding
in the conventions of the second generation. Under the Brussels Supple-
mentary Convention the public intervention has more than doubled,9" and
the IAEA regime added a public compensation component where one did
not exist under the conventions of the first generation.
II. COMPENSATION OF NUCLEAR DAMAGE IN THE U.S.
In the United States, nuclear liability is governed by the Price-
Anderson Act adopted in 1957. 91 A specific feature of the Price-Anderson
Act is that it has been regularly revised.92 In practice the revisions took
place approximately every decade. First, we will discuss the most impor-
tant aspects of the Price-Anderson Act, as well as its evolution over the
years. Second, we will pay attention to a specific feature of U.S. nuclear
law: the property rule. Finally, we will discuss a recent development in
U.S. policy: the ratification and implementation of the CSC.
A. The Price-Anderson Act and its Evolutions over the Years
1. The 1957 Regime
The original Price-Anderson Act divided the costs of insuring against
nuclear accidents between the private nuclear operator and a govern-
ment program.93 The government program effectively imposed some of
89See Vanden Borre, supra note 40.
9 Compare Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 72, at art. 3 with Protocol
to Amend the Brussels Supplementary Convention, supra note 77, at art. C.
" Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Price-Anderson), Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71
Stat. 576 (1957).
9 The Price-Anderson Act has been revised in 1966, 1975, 1988, and 2005. See Pub. L.
No. 89-645,80 Stat. 891 (1966); Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111 (1975); Pub. L. No. 100-
408, 102 Stat. 1066 (1988); Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 779 (2005).
9 Vanden Borre, supra note 40, at 299.
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the insurance cost on "the nation that benefits from the development of
nuclear energy.... .'9 The Price-Anderson Act required that the operator
purchase insurance coverage for $60 million, while the government made
$500 million available for compensation in case of a civil nuclear acci-
dent.9 5 By having public funds provide the majority of compensation, the
American nuclear energy industry benefited greatly.96
The current Price-Anderson Act includes a provision defining an
extraordinary nuclear occurrence ("ENO")."7 "[I] n case of a nuclear acci-
dent, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [("NRC")] is given the power
to determine whether... there is an [ENO]."g9 ENO classification pre-
vents the operator from exercising tort law defenses.99 Therefore, the Price-
Anderson Act effectively creates strict liability for nuclear operators in the
event of a nuclear accident. 0 The only exceptions are for claims arising
out of an act of war, workmen's compensation claims, and claims for dam-
age to on-site property at a licensed nuclear facility.' As a result of this
94 Id.
" Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Price-Anderson), Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71
Stat. 576, 577 (1957).96 Vanden Borre, supra note 40, at 299 n.106.
" Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat.
891, 891 (1966).
9
' Vanden Borre, supra note 40, at 299.
" Brown (1995), supra note 4, at 4; Omer F. Brown II, Recent Developments from the
Perspective of the United States, in CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY
LAW: HARMONISING LEGISLATION IN CEEC/NIS 479 (Natalie L.J.T. Horbach ed., 1999);
Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?-The Sixty-Three
Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1989).
" Vanden Borre, supra note 40, at 299. "Under the 'omnibus' coverage feature of the
Price-Anderson Act, the system covers 'anyone liable' for 'public liability.' 'Public liability'
is defined in the Act as 'any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear
incident.'" Id. at 299-300.
101 American Nuclear Insurers, Nuclear Energy Liability Policy: Facility Form, Insuring
Agreements § TV (on file with author) [hereinafter ANI Facility Form]. The American
Nuclear Insurers ("ANI"), see infra Part III.B (discussing ANI as the American insurance
pooler), Facility Form nuclear liability policy currently may not cover "any legal liability"
except for the exceptions in the statute. See American Nuclear Insurers, Facility Form
Policy, httpJ/www.nuclearinsurance.com/Facility%2OForm.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2008). The Facility Form policy provides that ANI will ". . .pay on behalf of the named
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as covered
damages because of bodily injury or property damage, or as covered environmental cleanup
costs because of environmental damage." ANI Facility Form, Amendatory Endorsement
NE-71 (Jan. 1, 1990), § 1 (emphasis added). 'Covered environmental cleanup costs" are
defined as ".. . only those environmental cleanup costs which are incurred directly for
monitoring, testing for, cleaning up, neutralizing or containing environmental damage
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provision, anyone who can be held liable for the damage of a nuclear acci-
dent, including, for example, the supplier, can benefit from the liability
insurance coverage of the nuclear operator.
The functioning of this system was demonstrated after the Three
Mile Island accident in which all defendants, the nuclear operator, as well
as the designer and constructor of the nuclear power plant, were repre-
sented by one single law firm.12 Thus, unlike the international compen-
sation regime, the Price-Anderson Act has a system of economic channelling
and not legal channelling.'03 Like the international compensation system,
though, the Price-Anderson Act limits the liability of the nuclear operator."°
2. 1975: A Shift from Public to Private Funding Regime
An important step in shifting the burden to the operator was made
in 1975. Although the total compensation amount was at that time kept at
the same level as in 1957, it was decided that the part composed of public
funds needed to disappear gradually.'05 The Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy argued that in the early years of nuclear energy development, the
nuclear industry was not capable of bearing the financial burden arising
from nuclear electricity production, but that after several years the industry
as the result of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence or transportation incident; but
covered environmental cleanup costs do not include on-site cleanup costs." Id. at § 3. In
other words, the ANI policy already is written to exclude such environmental damages as
those resulting from a simple "nuclear incident" and damages res nullius or res communis.
This could result in a situation where the facility operator would be liable, but not have
primary insurance from ANI. In this situation, coverage could be provided by retrospective
assessments from all power plant operators. See infra Part III.C.
102 Brown (1999), supra note 99, at 481.
.03 Under a system of legal channeling of liability "[a] claim against these other persons
is legally impossible, precisely because of the fact that liability is completely concen-
trated on one person." Tom Vanden Borre, Channelling ofLiability: A Few Juridical and
Economic Views on an Inadequate Legal Construction, in CONTEMPORARYDEVELOPMENTS
IN NUCLEAR ENERGYLAW: HARMONISING LEGISLATION IN CEEC/NIS 13,27 (Natalie L.J.T.
Horbach ed., 1999). Economic channeling means that the rules of ordinary tort law remain
applicable, but that the economic burden of such liability lies with only one person. "Other
persons than those to which liability is economically channeled can therefore be held
legally liable, in the sense that they can reclaim the amounts paid from the one who is
economically liable." Id. This is exactly the case under the Price-Anderson Act. Suppliers
can be held liable, but their liability is covered by the omnibus coverage of the nuclear
operator. See id. at 28.
" See Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (Price-Anderson), Pub. L. No. 85-256,
71 Stat. 576, 577 (1957).
105 H.R. Rep. No. 94-648, at 10 (1975).
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should take its responsibilities. 16 This could be achieved by shifting the
burden of the government towards the industry.' 7
The government shifted the burden to the nuclear industry by
introducing a new concept in the compensation scheme, the so-called
retrospective premium.' This is a premium financed by all American
nuclear operators which have received a licence from the NRC. When the
damage exceeds the amount of the nuclear operator's individual liability
coverage of $60 million, the retrospective premium comes into play. This
effectively constitutes a second tier of compensation. It implies an addi-
tional financial protection per power plant and per incident, payable in
annual installments up to a certain maximum amount per incident per
power plant.'09 Basically, the 1975 amendment to the Price-Anderson Act
gradually replaced the public funding by a collective tier of all U.S. licensed
nuclear operators.
The NRC was given the power to determine the amount of this
premium and in 1975, set this premium at $5 million, per the statutory
recommendation."0 It was also decided that the individual liability in-
surance coverage of each nuclear operator should be consistent with the
evolution on the American nuclear insurance market."'
By 1982 government indemnification had been completely replaced
by the retroactive premiums." 2 After 1982, the U.S. nuclear compensation
scheme was entirely privately funded." 3 Nuclear operators provided the
1957 amount of indemnification-$560 million-with $160 million of pri-
vate insurance and $400 million of collective insurance.114 The collective
"amount increased as new nuclear reactors became operational."" 5
106 Id.
'
07Id. at 2.
108 See id. at 9.
109 See id.
" An Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89
Stat. 1111, 1112 (1975); Statement Concerning the Price-Anderson Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of
the H. Com. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Price-Anderson Hearing]
(statement of Maijorie S. Nordlinger, Senior Att'y, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission),
available at http'//vww.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/congress-docs/congress-testimony/
2001/.
"' See Price-Anderson Hearing.
112 Id. at 3-4.
113 Id.
114Vanden Borre, supra note 40, at 301.
115Id.
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3. 2005: Increase to $10.76 Billion
The most recent amendment of the Price-Anderson Act took place
in 2005 in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, signed by the President on
August 8, 2005.116 The liability of the individual operator was increased
to $300 million.117 However, the amount available in the second (collective)
tier, was set at $95.8 million, plus an extra 5% for legal costs, with a maxi-
mum annual retroactive premium of $15 million per reactor per year.118
Given the fact that in 2005 104 reactors had a license, 119 the total avail-
able amount in the U.S. is $10.76 billion: $300 million of the first tier +
the second tier of $10,461 million [(95.8 + 5%) x 104].120 Moreover, the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 extended Price-Anderson coverage through the
end of 2025.121
The changes and the total amount available today in 2008 are
summarized in Table 4.
TABLE 4: SCHEMATIC OVERVIEW OF PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
COMPENSATION
Schematic Overview of Price-Anderson Act Compensation
(in Million Dollars)
Year Individual Additional funding Total
liability amount
nuclear Government Retrospective available
operator indemnity premium
1957 60 500 - 560
1982 160 0 400 560
2005 300 0 10461 10761
"' Energy Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 779 (2005); see Nuclear Energy Agency,
United States: Price-Anderson Act Renewal (2005), 23.2 NEA NEWS, 2005, at 32-33.
117 See Nuclear Energy Agency, supra note 116.
118 Id.
"' U.S. NRC, List of Power Reactor Units, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/list-
power-reactor-units.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2008) (as of Nov. 2007, 104 reactors still
had licenses).
"
0 See Nuclear Energy Agency, supra note 116, at 32.
121 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 602, 119 Stat. 594, 779 (2005).
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B. The NRC Property Rule
After the Three Mile Island accident, it became clear that cleanup
of the onsite damage to the nuclear power plant would be far more impor-
tant than the third-party liability coverage of the nuclear operator. 122
The NRC argued that this could cause a delay in the decontamination of
the site,'23 which of course would cause damage to third parties. The NRC
argued that it was necessary that the sums available for the property in-
surance of the power plants should in the first used for decontaminating
the nuclear site and for stabilizing the nuclear reactor. 2 4 Therefore, the
NRC introduced the so-called property rule.125 According to the property
rule, each power reactor licensee:
shall take reasonable steps to obtain insurance available
at reasonable costs and on reasonable terms from private
sources or to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the NRC
that it possesses an equivalent amount of protection cover-
ing the licensee's obligation, in the event of an accident at
the licensee's reactor, to stabilize and decontaminate the
reactor and the reactor station site at which the reactor
experiencing the accident is located . 126
Every operator must have a minimum coverage for each reactor station
site of $1.06 billion. 127
The property rule, though, does not automatically require that oper-
ators who suffer any nuclear accident must first spend the insurance pro-
ceeds on stabilization and decontamination. Spending on stabilization and
decontamination are only prioritized if the estimated costs of these activities
exceed $100 million. 2 ' In the event that such spending is prioritized, "[tihe
122 Changes in Property Insurance Requirements of NRC Licensed Nuclear Power Plants,
49 Fed. Reg. 44645, 44649-50 (Nov. 8, 1984) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50).
123 Id. at 44649.
'2 Id. at 44647, 44649.
125The language prioritizing decontamination was introduced in 1984. See id. at 44650. The
current version of the language was adopted in 1990. Stabilization and Decontamination
Priority and Trusteeship Provisions, 55 Fed. Reg. 12163, 12166 (Apr. 2, 1990).
126 Conditions of Licenses, 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(w) (2008).
127 Id. at § 50.54(w)(1). These funds are to be used only for a safe shutdown and on-site
cleanup. Id. This was required by NRC after the Three Miles Island accident when the
operator did not have sufficient funds to pay for on-site cleanup. See Changes in Property
Insurance Requirements of NRC Licensed Nuclear Power Plants, 49 Fed. Reg. at 44648.
12 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(w)(4)(i).
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priority... must remain in effect for 60 days or, upon order of the Director
[of the NRC], for such longer periods .... 129 The regulation indicates that
the prioritization should stop only when the reactor stops posing "any
significant risk to the public health and safety."
130
Accordingly, the property rule guarantees a first party insurance
coverage of the property damage to the nuclear power plant. By requir-
ing that funds be made available for the decontamination of the plant,
decontamination will lead to a reduction of risks to the public, and thus
to a reduction of third-party losses. In that sense, the property rule can
be beneficial to victims of a nuclear accident.
C. 2007-2008: Implementation of the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation
On May, 21, 2008, the U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification
of the CSC at the Vienna headquarters of the IAEA.131 Section 934 of the
Energy Independence and Security Act of December 19, 2007 provided for
the cost allocation of the CSC and thus implemented the obligations of
the U.S. under CSC. 132 An aim of the Energy Independence and Security
Act was to establish a funding mechanism under the Price-Anderson Act
for the U.S. contribution to the international nuclear liability compensa-
tion system.'33 CSC implementation was initially provided for by a
separate law on the CSC cost allocation. 3 4 As a result of an amendment
submitted by Senator Voinovich, the CSC was introduced into the
Energy Independence and Security Act on June 21, 2007.13' The Senate
passed the bill on December 13, 2007,136 and the House of Representa-
tives followed suit on December 18, 2007.13 The act was signed by the
President the following day-December 19, 2007.138 The CSC is thus
129 id.
130 id.
131 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 6.
132 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934, 121 Stat.
1492, 1741 (2007).
133 Id. at 121 Stat. 1742.
134 152 CONG. REC. S10798-S10802 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006).
135 153 CONG. REC. S8206, S8212-14 (daily ed. June 21,2007); Library of Congress: Thomas,
H.R. 6, All Actions, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dll0:HR00006:@@S (last
visited Oct. 1, 2008) (recording Sen. Voinovich's amendment).
136 153 Cong. Rec. S15432 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2007).
117 153 Cong. Rec. H16752 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2007).
" Remarks on Signing the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 43 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1612-14 (Dec. 19, 2007).
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merely a small portion in the much broader Energy Independence and
Security Act. Significantly, in his press statement, the President made
no mention of the implementation of the CSC.'39 He did, however, men-
tion the necessity to provide incentives for nuclear energy, inter alia, as
a reaction to climate change. 4 °
It is interesting to briefly mention the findings and purpose of the
implementation of the CSC as formulated in section 934(a). It states, inter
alia, that the "[CSC] benefits U.S. nuclear suppliers that face potentially
unlimited liability for nuclear incidents [outside the U.S.] that are not
covered by the Price-Anderson Act by replacing a potentially open-ended
liability with a predictable regime.... "1 41 Also important is that the Energy
Independence and Security Act requires that "nuclear supplier[s] ... par-
ticipate in a retrospective risk pooling program... to cover the contingent
costs... " of the U.S. contribution pursuant to the CSC.1'42 This means
that, according to the Energy Independence and Security Act, the U.S.
Treasury will pay into the fund provided for by the CSC but, the costs will
be reimbursed by a payment program that suppliers have to set up. Thus,
the U.S. obligation under the CSC will be shifted to market participants-
the nuclear suppliers. This illustrates that the fact a country has an obli-
gation to make public funds available, as under an international convention,
but that does not necessarily mean that the taxpayer will eventually have
to pay for it.'4 Note that the U.S. contribution to the second tier of the
CSC will vary between roughly 40 and 100 million SDRs ($65.332 and
$164.361 million).'"
The fact that the U.S. passed this legislation implementing the
CSC is a remarkable evolution in civil nuclear liability compensation for
two reasons. First, it changes U.S. policy by entering the U.S. civil nuclear
industry into the international nuclear liability regime, though only the
CSC. The fact that the U.S. ratified the CSC is in itself not be enough for
139 See id.
140 Id. at 1614.
141 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934(a)(1)(D),
121 Stat. 1492, 1741 (2007).
142Id. at 121 Stat. at 1744.
" See infra Part V, for further discussion of the consequences of implementing the CSC.
144 The contribution of each country in the CSC indeed depends on the number of countries
that become member to the CSC. For a calculator, see IAEA, Calculator-Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, http://ola.iaea.org/CSCND/Calculate
.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
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the entry into force of the CSC.'45 It is, however, a very important step
and might motivate other States to join the CSC. For example, if either
France or Japan were to become a member, it would trigger the entry into
force of the CSC.'4 6 Second, it is important because the U.S. has immedi-
ately shifted its financial burden under the CSC to the private sector
nuclear suppliers. Thus, the U.S. has a policy of not making the taxpayer
finance this international obligation. 4 '
III. NUCLEAR INSURANCE
In this section we will analyze the system of nuclear insurance
because it has a major influence on liability and the compensation for
nuclear damage. First, we will discuss the nuclear insurance pools. Second,
we will examine the way the nuclear risk is insured in the United States.
Finally, we will compare the existing nuclear mutual insurance schemes
in the U.S. and Europe.
A. The Nuclear Insurance Pools
Traditional insurance companies do not provide coverage for
damage caused by a nuclear accident. 1"' Insurance for nuclear damage
is generally provided for by nuclear insurance pools.'49 The insurance of
1 To enter into force, the CSC requires that at least five states ratify the convention and
that at least 400,000 units of installed nuclear capacity be covered under the convention.
CSC, supra note 43, at art. XX; supra Table 2.
4 Both France and Japan have enough installed nuclear capacity to qualify both
conditions for the CSC's entry into force. See CSC, supra note 43, at art. XX; IAEA,
Calculator- Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,
http://ola.iaea.org/ CSCND/Calculate.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2008).
147 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934(a)(1)(H),
121 Stat. 1492, 1742 (2007). The Act explicitly specifies that "any such contribution
should be funded in a manner that does not ... shift to Federal taxpayers liability risks
for nuclear accidents at foreign installations." Id.
" See J.C. Dow, The Organisation and Development of International Liability Capacity
and National Market Pools, with Special Reference to New "Nuclear Countries," in NUCLEAR
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY INSURANCE: STATUS AND PROSPECTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE MUNICH
SYMPOsiuM: 10-14TH SEPTEMBER 1984 177 (NEA-IAEA, 1985).
149 See S.M.S. Reitsma, Nuclear Insurance Pools: History and Development, in NUCLEAR
ACCIDENTS: LIABILITIES AND GUARANTEES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HELSINKI SYMPOSIUM, 31
AuGUST-3 SEPTEMBER 1992 341 (NEA-IAEA, 1993); J.C. Dow, NUCLEAR ENERGY AND
INSURANCE (Witherby & Co., 1989); W.E. Belser, Uber die Zweckmaj6igkeit der Poolung
von Atomrisiken, 18 VERSICHERUNGSWIETSCHAFT 572 (1959); Nuclear Power: Insurance
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nuclear risks through nuclear insurance pools could be regarded as a bun-
dling of resources at a national level. 5 ° Such bundling allows the creation
of a supply to meet the demand for insurance coverage' 5' for damage re-
sulting from nuclear incidents. As a result, small insurance companies can
participate in the insurance of nuclear risks without putting their own
financial capacity at risk.'52 In this respect, the market can provide for
insurance coverage for risks that surpasses the capacity of any individual
member of the pool. Indeed, through the existence of such pools, every
insurance company that wishes so can execute a contract with the pool
in which it will be decided which part of the coverage that company will
insure.5 3 Every pool member declares annually the amount it is willing
or able to provide in insurance coverage.5 4 The capacity of the pool is
therefore equal to the contributions of all its members. 5 When payments
have to be made, each member of the pool will have to contribute a ratio
of its participation as contractually agreed with the pool. 5 ' Re-insurance
of the nuclear risk will take place among pools. 7 According to insurers,
this strategy results in a two-fold advantage. Since every member of the
pool knows exactly for which amount it will be responsible, members are
willing to insure a much larger part of the nuclear risk than with respect
to conventional industrial risks. 5 ' Moreover, re-insurance is directly
and the Pooling System, SPECIAL EDITION OF THE NUCLEAR POOLS' BULLETIN (1992) (on
file with author).
" Dow, supra note 148, at 178 (describing the national pools that developed in European
countries in the late 1950s).
.
511d. at 177. Most pools provide for coverage for third party liability as well as damage
to the operator itself. Id. at 179-80. The (mandatory) liability insurance of the operator
covers in general the compensatory consequences of extra-contractual liability of the oper-
ator of a nuclear installation for damage resulting from a nuclear incident, even if the
incident was directly due to a grave natural disaster. Cf Exposd des Motifs, at para. 48
("The only exonerations lie in the case of... grave natural disasters of an exceptional
character.. ." (emphasis added)). This policy should be clearly separated from the policy
covering potential damage to the operator itself. Dow, supra note 148, at 179-80.
152 See Dow, supra note 148, at 180-81.
153 See American Nuclear Insurers, SFP Policy, http://www.nuclearinsurance.com/SFP
.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) (advertising the ANI's participation in pooled insurance).
" Dow, supra note 148, at 178.
155 Id.
156 Id.
15 See id. That is why a large number of insurance companies worldwide had to interfere
as reinsurer in respect of the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. The two American pools
were reinsured with most other pools in the world. See 1 PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
CATASTROPHIC NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ch. 1 (1990), available at
http'//www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/news/rpccna/pcrcna07.htm.
53 See Dow, supra note 148, at 178-79.
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established between the different national pools without intervention of
third parties, which minimizes the costs.'59
Most countries with nuclear power plants have their own national
nuclear insurance pools. 6' The effect is that, as far as third party liability
is concerned, a Belgian nuclear operator can only buy insurance with the
Belgian pool, the German operator with the German pool, and so forth.
161
Even if the nuclear operators tender for the most favorable insurance
offer, they only receive offers from their national pool. The monopolistic
position of the nuclear insurers has been heavily criticized.6 2
These pools provide coverage for both third-party liability and
damage to the nuclear power plant itself (first party liability).'63 These
two forms of liability coverage draw against each other in the pools.' In
other words, if the capacity of a nuclear insurance pool is partially used
to cover property damage to the nuclear installation, there will be less
capacity left for cover third-party liability. Some argue that first party
liability coverage should surpass third-party coverage.'65 One justification
for increased first party coverage is that nuclear accidents will always affect
the nuclear power plant, causing first party damage, but will not always
affect the surrounding area, which would trigger third-party liability.
166
'5 See Reitsma, supra note 149, at 345.
'6 See, e.g., Dow, supra note 148, at 178.161 Cf American Nuclear Insurers, About ANI, http://www.nuclearinsurance.com/About
%20ANI.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2008) ("We directly write nuclear liability insurance
for nuclear facilities in the United States... ").
'
62 Michael G. Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, Restrictions of Competition on Insurance
Markets and the Applicability of EC Antitrust Law, 48 KYKLOS 65, 78-82 (1995); see also
Faure, supra note 53, at 31-32.
See Dow, supra note 148, at 179-80.
' Faure, supra note 53, at 26.
165 Dow, supra note 148, at 80; see also supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
166 W. Mifller, The Role of the Insurance Industry in Covering Nuclear Third Party
Liability Risks, in NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY INSURANCE: STATUS AND PROSPECTS,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE MUNICH SYMPOSIUM: 10-14TH SEPTEMBER 1984 171 (NEA-IAEA,
1985). Miiller notes:
In view of the rising cost of erecting nuclear energy plants,
nuclear property insurance, which is likewise borne by the nuclear pools,
is under considerable pressure and, in turn, represents an involvement
by the insurance industry to the machinery insurance which, in the
case of a nuclear power plant, also goes into the millions. Both forms
of cover have priority over liability insurance, since a theoretical large
scale nuclear occurrence would probably first affect the material assets
within the plant, then the surrounding area.
It is naive to consider only the third party suffering loss or
damage-as occasionally happens-and to regard property insurance
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Nuclear insurers have urged for the removal of first party liability
from the nuclear insurance pools.' Under current arrangements, the
insurers would still retain a monopoly in the nuclear insurance market,
causing the premiums on first party insurance to be relatively high.
16 8
Insurers have spoken favorably of the undoing of the protectionism of the
early civil nuclear age and the introduction of a more competitive system
for nuclear insurance.'6 9 "Given [the] high concentration on the nuclear
insurance market in some countries, initiatives have been taken by the
nuclear industry, in cooperation with some brokers, to withdraw first-
party insurance from the nuclear pools and to cover this through a new
mutual insurance fund of nuclear power plant operators."7 °
Before discussing the existing nuclear mutual insurance scheme
in more detail, it is important to highlight the way the U.S. nuclear insur-
ance market functions, particularly with respect to the first (individual)
and second (collective) layer of the nuclear operator's liability.
B. Third Party Liability Insurance in the U.S.
Just as in Europe, U.S. operators can only operate a nuclear power
plant with a license, and they can only obtain licenses when they are able
to prove compliance with the liability insurance provisions of the Price-
as an unnecessary appendage which only absorbs capacity. Every reason-
able person knows that a nuclear power plant requires a heavy invest-
ment and that not only the operators, but also their creditors, should be
protected. It is quite simply foolish to regard the loss of this investment
as a sort of 'punishment' for having brought about a nuclear occurrence
and to ignore the interests of the power supply company and the inves-
tors in safeguarding their material assets.
Id.
167 See id.; Michael G. Faure & Vronique Bruggeman, Presentation at the 24th Annual
Conference ofthe European Association ofLaw and Economics in Copenhagen, Denmark:
Catastrophic Risks and First-Party Insurance 15 (Sept. 13-15, 2007), available at www
.cbs.dk/content/download/67298/930270/file/V6ronique%2OBruggeman.pdf(indicating that
pooled insurance may fail to provide coverage because of a lack of competition in the
insurance market).
6 Faure, supra note 53, at 26.
69L.L.J. Vigneron, Discussion in Session II of the Munich Symposium on Nuclear Third
Party Liability and Insurance (Sept. 10-14, 1984), in NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY
INSURANCE: STATUS AND PROSPECTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE MUNICH SYMPOSIUM: 10-14TH
SEPTEMBER 1984 (NEA-IAEA, 1985), at 192.
170 Faure, supra note 53, at 26 (citation omitted).
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Anderson Act.' 1 "The NRC requires each licensee to show proof that it has
liability insurance that includes the $300 million of primary insurance
coverage... required by the Price-Anderson Act."'72 "[The] NRC and the
licensee also sign an indemnity agreement that requires the latter to
maintain an insurance policy in the same amount."' 3 "[However, the]
NRC relies on American Nuclear Insurers [(ANI)]... to send [it] the
annual endorsements documenting proof of insurance after the licensees
have paid their annual premiums. In addition to the primary insurance
coverage, licensees must show proof of secondary insurance to NRC," i.e.,
retrospective premiums.'74 This is however not a "genuine" insurance
policy like the one in the first tiers, but it is common practice that every
nuclear operator signs a bond for payment or retrospective premiums as
proof of the secondary insurance.' 5 "This bond is a contractual arrange-
ment between the licensee and American Nuclear Insurers that obligates
the licensee to pay [ANI] the retrospective premiums" if necessary.'76
A study performed by the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO")
in May 2004 noted that "licensees must provide evidence that they are
maintaining a guarantee of payment of retrospective premiums."'77
According to the GAO report
the licensee must provide the NRC with evidence that it
maintains one of the following six types of guarantees:
(1) surety bond, (2) letter of credit, (3) revolving credit/term
loan agreement, (4) maintenance of escrow deposits of gov-
ernment securities, (5) annual certified financial statements
showing either that a cash flow can be generated and would
be available for payment of retrospective premiums within
three months of submission of the statements or a cash
reserve or combination of these, or (6) such other type of
guarantee as may be approved by the Commission.7 '
171 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS, NUCLEAR REGULATION: NRC'S LIABLITY INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS OWNED BY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIEs 1 (2004).
172 Id. at 2.
173 Id.
174 Id.
171 Id. at 2-3.
176 Id. at 2-3.
177 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 171, at 7.
178 Id. at 7-8.
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If a nuclear accident in the U.S. exceeds the primary coverage of
$300 million, the ANI will immediately collect the retrospective premi-
ums.'79 ANI believes, as reported to the GAO that "the bond for payment
of retrospective premiums is legally binding and obligates the licensee
to pay the premium."18° If the operator fails to pay its share of the retro-
spective premiums, ANI is contractually obligated to pay up to $30 million
of the premiums, and collect it later from the licensees.'18 However, if the
licensee fails to pay this deferred premium, the NRC reserves the right to
pay those premiums on the licensee's behalf and recover the premiums
from the licensee.
8 2
Of course, such a bond might cause the nuclear operator's insol-
vency in case of a nuclear accident. This specific issue has been addressed
in the U.S., especially when limited companies are concerned. The NRC
does not seem to conduct an in-depth financial review to determine the
licensee's ability to pay the retrospective premiums. Instead, the NRC re-
views a licensee's financial ability to safely operate its plant and to con-
tribute decommissioning funds to the future retirements of the plant.8 3
Apparently the NRC is of the opinion that if an operator is able "to cover
these two larger expenses, they are likely to be capable of paying their
retrospective premiums.""s However, "[ANI] goes further than the NRC
and requires limited liability companies provide a letter of guarantee from
their parent or other affiliated companies with sufficient assets to cover
the retrospective premiums. " "' The GAO reports that if the parent com-
pany does not provide a letter of guarantee, the ANI can refuse to issue the
bond for payment of retrospective premiums. 6 In that case, the company
would have to rely upon other means to show the NRC proof of secondary
insurance.'87
As already indicated, the nuclear insurance pools generally offer
insurance coverage both for property damage and third party liability. 88
This, however, is not the case in the U.S.: the ANI pool only concerns third-
party liability. In the U.S., the nuclear insurance pool insures only the
171 Id. at 1, 8.
180 Id. at8.
181 Id. at 3.
182 Id. at 8.
183 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 171, at 9.
184 Id.
'8 Id. at3.
'8 Id. at 9.
187 Id.
"
88 See supra notes 148-70 and accompanying text.
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individual third-party liability of the nuclear operator. As such, the retro-
spective premium is not insured. The retrospective premium is, as was just
explained, a call to which operators need to respond after an accident takes
place, and only if the damage exceeds the liability limit of the American
operator-$300 million. In the latter case the NRC merely requires a bond
whereby the operator is obligated to pay ANI the retrospective premiums.
ANI "write [s] nuclear liability insurance for nuclear facilities in
the United States, and assume [s] reinsurance shares on nuclear busi-
ness written by other nuclear pools and mutual insurers throughout the
world."" 9 In the 1970s, there were two nuclear insurance pools in the
United States.9 0 Since 1998, the ANI is the only remaining nuclear in-
surance pool in the U.S. 9' Property insurance is being taken care of by
Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited ("NEIL"), incorporated under the
laws of Bermuda with its place of business in Delaware.192 NEIL is one
of the existing nuclear mutual insurance systems set up by operators. Its
functions are discussed below.
C. The Nuclear Mutual Insurance Systems
1. U.S.
The origins of NEIL go back to 1973 when about fourteen American
nuclear operators created their own mutual insurance system, called
Nuclear Mutual Limited ("NVEL").193 After the accident at Three Mile
..9 American Nuclear Insurers, supra note 161.
[ANI's] Domestic Syndicate offers third-party nuclear liability
insurance to domestic operators ofnuclear power reactors, nuclear fuel
fabrication facilities, waste disposal and other nuclear facilities. It also
writes nuclear liability insurance for suppliers of products or services
(including transportation services), to these facilities.
[The] Foreign Syndicate provides reinsurance to foreign nuclear
pools for placement at nuclear facilities overseas and in Canada and
Mexico. Reinsurance is assumed on a facultative basis ... The Foreign
Syndicate also writes direct liability coverage for U.S. suppliers of
products or services to foreign nuclear facilities.
Id.
'90 See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION supra note 157.
191 Dow, supra note 148, at 178.
192 Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited, NEIL History, httpJ/www.nmlneil.com/members/
default.aspx (follow "About NEIL" hyperlink, then follow "Company Information"
hyperlink; then follow "NEIL History" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 2, 2008). Note that a sig-
nificant portion of NEIL is reinsured with ANI. American Nuclear Insurers, supra note 161.
193 Dow, supra note 149, at 267-68.
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Island, a second nuclear mutual insurer emerged: NEIL 94 The reason why
these mutuals (captive insurance companies) were created, was to provide
the nuclear operators with an alternative to the insurance offered by ANI. 9'
Today, NEIL insures nuclear plants and their generating units for
costs associated with interruptions of electric generation due to accidental
physical damage to insured sites, decontamination expenses, and other
risks of direct physical loss at insured sites. 9 ' "The primary property pro-
gram provides insurance coverage of $500 million per occurrence. The
excess program provides property insurance coverage of $2.25 billion per
occurrence in excess of $500 million per occurrence."'97 Thus, NEIL's total
coverage of property damage in the U.S. amounts to $2.75 billion. It is
generally acknowledged that NEIL has been a success. According to Dow,
this is partially thanks to NEIL's ability to attract important reinsurance
support from ANI because NEIL covers risks not insured by ANI.' Nuclear
operators supported both NEIL and ANI, enabling NEIL's reinsurance
through ANI without operators accumulating commitments.' 99
In 1999, NEIL started the activities of its subsidiary, called
Overseas NEIL ("ONEIL") located in Dublin, in order to expand its inter-
national activities. °0 In 2001, ONEIL insured sites in Belgium, Germany,
South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland.
20 1
Hence, in the U.S., there is a clear distinction in nuclear insurance.
The American pool, ANI, only offers third-party liability cover.20 2 Property
damage is insured with the operator's own mutual insurance scheme,
NEIL.2 ' However, NEIL and the ANI work closely together as far as rein-
surance is concerned. 2 4 In Europe, the distinction between third-party
insurance and property damage insurance is not as clear because nuclear
"' Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited, supra note 192.
'9 DOw, supra note 149, at 268 ("[ANI] and NML regarded each other as strong competitors
who could not be expected to collaborate.").
196 NUCLEAR ELECTRIC INSURANCE LIMITED, 2006 ANNuAL REPORT 20 (2006), available at
http://www.nmlneil.com/Members/AboutNEIL/ar2006.pdf.
197 Id.
198 Dow, supra note 149, at 268.
199 Id.2 Richard A. Abdoo et al., Letter from our Chairmen and President, in NUCLEAR ELECTRIC
INSURANCE LIMITED, ANNUAL REPORT: CHANGING TIMES ENDURING STRENGTH 2 (1999),
available at http://www.nmlneil.com/Members/AboutNEIL/ar1999.pdf.
201 Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited, Facing Business Challenges, http://www.nmlneil
.com/Members/AboutNEIL/2001ar/fbchallenge.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).202 American Nuclear Insurers, supra note 161.
203 Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited, supra note 192.
2 American Nuclear Insurers, supra note 161.
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insurance pools offer both. In Europe, however, several operators have
combined forces into two mutual insurance schemes.
2. Europe
In Europe, nuclear operators created mutual insurance schemes
as a reaction to the nuclear insurance pools.2" 5 In 1978, European Mutual
Association for Nuclear Insurance ("EMANI") was created with the goal
of reducing the insurance premiums of its members. 26 EMANI offers cov-
erage for certain insurance risks relating not only to nuclear power sta-
tions, but also to other nuclear facilities in several European countries.2 7
As EMANI is a mutual insurance association of nuclear operators, the
capacity offered by EMANI is independent from the capacity of the nuclear
insurance pools,20 8 the latter basically being an association of "regular"
insurance companies. EMANI, more specifically, provides insurance cover-
age for material damage and business interruption.2"9 However, and this
is a difference between the U.S. and Europe, American nuclear operators
insure against business interruption for quite considerable amounts while
European nuclear primarily cover damage to their installations, protect-
ing against business interruption liabilities to a lesser extent.210
At the end of 2002, European Liability Insurance for the Nuclear
Industry ("ELINI") was also created.21' As EMANI, ELINI is a Belgian
mutual insurance association.2 2 The aim of ELINI is "to provide insurance
capacity for nuclear liability risks of its Members."213 The capacity of ELINI
is independent from the capacity offered by the various nuclear insurance
205 Dow, supra note 149, at 269.
2 6 Id. at 269 (describing the role of EMANI as a coinsurer, thereby spreading risk and
reducing premiums).2 0 7 EUROPEAN MUTUAL ASSOCIATION FOR NUCLEAR INSURANCE [EMANI], ANNUAL REPORT
2003 14 (2003), available at httpJ/www.emani.be/EMANI2003.pdf.208 id.
209 Id.
210 Compare NUCLEAR ELECTRIC INSURANCE LIMITED, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2007)
(emphasizing NEIL's efforts against service interruption), available at httpj/www.nmlneil
.con/Members/AboutNEIL/ar2007.pdf, with EMANI, supra note 207, at 14 ("EMANI's
current portfolio is principally based on property damage cover... ").
211 EUROPEAN LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY [ELINI], ANNUAL REPORT
2006 14 (2006).
212 Id.
213 id.
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pools. 214 ELINI is thus able to provide "[a]dditional insurance capacity
in view of the revised Paris and Brussels Supplementary Conventions."215
It can also offer "[alternative insurance capacity for terrorism and [for
the] 30-year prescription period."21 Thus, ELINI is the first worldwide
mutual insurance company of nuclear operators aimed at offering nuclear
third-party liability coverage. Where NEIL is primarily active on the first-
party insurance market, ELINI is trying to develop a European third-
party liability insurance market, and is thus active on the same market
as the traditional nuclear insurance pools. However, it seems that in the
next few years, ELINI will not be a real competitor to the pools, but instead
will be offering excess capacity,1 7 especially on issues that are difficult
to insure on the primary nuclear insurance market, such as the 30-year
prescription period, terrorism coverage, and environmental damage.21
As discussed earlier, these are typically the issues raised by the nuclear
liability conventions of the second generation, especially the Protocol to
the Paris Convention and the Protocol to the Vienna Convention.1 9
Only private or public companies or authorities operating nuclear
installations can become members of EMANI and ELINI. 22 ° Companies
such as EDF, British Energy, E.ON, RWE, and Vattenfall are members
of EMANI and/or ELINI.
221
One can notice considerable differences in the success of the mutual
nuclear insurance schemes in the U.S. and in Europe. It is striking that
the growth of EMANI was quite slow. In the first decade of its existence,
the insurance capacity of EMANI remained rather moderate at approxi-
mately 4E150 million ($238.32 million).222 The capacity increased to about
E400 million ($635.52 million) by the end of the 1990s, and amounted
to E700 million in 2005 ($1.112 billion).223 ELINI's maximum insurance
214 id.
215 Id.
216 ELINI, supra note 211, at 14.
217 Id. ("It is not expected that ELINI, as a relatively small member of the liability market,
deals with claims in the event of a catastrophe.").21 1 Id.; Accord Insuring a Nuclear Future, LLOYD'S MARKET, Aug. 2008, at 10, available
at http://www.Uoyds.com/NR/rdonlyres/304DB810-EA6C-4539-9330-2FF84772A05B/O/
TheMarketlssue32008.pdf.219 See supra Part I.B.
220 ELINI, supra note 211, at 15.
221 EMANI, ANNUAL REPORT 2007 7 (2007), available at http://www.emani.be/Annual
%20Report %202007.pdf; ELINI, ANNUAL REPORT 2007 6 (2007), available at http://www
.elini.net/ELINI_2008 FINAL.pdf.222 See EMANI, supra note 207, at 16.
m See id.
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capacity in 2006 was E104.85 million ($166.58 million).224 An important
element explaining this lack of enthusiasm from the industry to step into
this European nuclear mutual insurance scheme seems to be the "lack
of solidarity among [European] nuclear power station operators."225 It is
indeed quite striking that European nuclear operators have varied policies
for their coverage of property damage: some buy coverage with the nuclear
pools, others are member of EMANI, and still others opt for the American
captive, NEIL.226
These different policies in insuring property damage have two con-
sequences that interact with the capacity available for covering third-
party liability. First, the fact that some nuclear operators insure their
property damage with the pool decreases the overall capacity of the pools
to cover other risks, i.e., third-party liability.227 Second, European opera-
tors have been less inclined to participate in mutual third-party liability
schemes, like EMANI. 22' The lack of cooperation means that, as mentioned,
European nuclear operators buy large insurance coverage for property
damage, but seem to be less interested in buying coverage for business
interruption, aggravating the lack of third-party liability coverage. 22 9
Also remarkable is the fact that the overseas activities of NEIL has
slowly grown,3 0 such that, little by little, ONEIL is becoming an EMANI
competitor. It is not within the scope of this paper to explain why at least
some European nuclear operators seem to favor the American instead of
the European nuclear captive. However, one should consider an impor-
tant difference between the captives: the activities and membership of
NEIL are strictly limited to nuclear electricity operators while EMANI's
members and activities extend to nuclear waste companies, fuel fabrica-
tion facilities, nuclear research laboratories as well.
224 ELINI, supra note 211, at 17.
225 M. Debaets, The Insurance of Nuclear Power Stations, in PROCEEDINGS: NUCLEAR INTER
JURA '91, NUCLEAR LAw AND NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR THE FUTURE, BATH, ENGLAND 23
SEPTEMBER-26 SEPTEMBER 1991 195, 198 (AIDN/INLA, 1991).
"
6 NUCLEAR ELECTRIC INSURANCE LIMITED, supra note 196, at 34-35; see supra notes 160-
61 and accompanying text; supra note 221 and accompanying text;
2 Debaets, supra note 225, at 195-96.228 See id. at 196.
' Among the large policies purchased by nuclear operators, only EMANI and NEIL cover
service interruption. See EMANI, supra note 207, at 14;NuCLEAR ELECTRIC INSURANCE
LIMITED, supra note 196, at 20. Even within those policies for service interruption, NEIL,
for example, only covers up to $4.5 million per week for a single incident. NUCLEAR
ELECTRIC INSURANCE LIMITED, supra note 196, at 20.
2 See supra note 201.
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IV. OVERVIEW AND EXAMPLES
A few examples may illustrate how the two nuclear compensation
systems discussed in this paper, the U.S. and the international, work.
Suppose first that a nuclear accident takes place in the U.S., causing
$200 million of damage. In that case, only the individual liability of the
nuclear operator would come into play. As discussed, each operator must
be covered up to $300 million-the amount at which individual liability is
capped. If that same accident takes place in Europe, the available amount
will first depend on the amounts available under the national legislation
of the country where the accident takes place. If the accident takes place
in Belgium, there would be 6300 million ($476.64 million) available,23'
and thus all damage would be compensated for under the third party
liability coverage of the nuclear operator. If the accident took place in
France, there would be E90 million ($142.992 million) available from the
operator 232"-EDF-which is partially covered through nuclear third party
insurance; the French State would have to pay the remaining E60 million
($95.328 million), as part of the second tier of the Brussels Supplementary
Convention.2 3
Suppose now that in a second example a nuclear accident occurs in
the U.S. causing $7 billion of damage. In the first layer, the liability in-
surer will have to compensate $300 million. This leaves a remainder of
$6.7 billion to be covered. The second layer is totally financed through
the collectivity of nuclear operators.234 Therefore, the $6.7 billion will be
financed collectively by all the 104 nuclear operators in the U.S. through
ANI, equaling $64.423 million per nuclear power plant. However, they
do not have to pay this amount of $64.423 million at one time. It will be
collected through retrospective premiums which are currently limited to
$15 million annually. 23' The result is that the second layer ($6.7 billion)
will be financed by the operators of all 104 nuclear power plants in a period
of five years, whereby each will pay $15 million during the next four years
and $4.423 million in the fifth year.
231 URICCHIO, supra note 67, at 3.
232/Id.
' Nuclear Energy Agency, Brussels Supplementary Convention, http://www.nea.fr/html/
law/brussels-supplementary-convention.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
' See supra Parts III.A-B.
235 Licensee Guarantees of Payments of Deferred Premiums, 10 C.F.R. § 140.21 (2008);
see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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In summary, the first $300 million comes from insurance provided
by the American pool, the remainder is to be provided by the operators of
each power reactor. The NRC guarantees these retrospective premiums,
subject to reimbursement with interest by the operators.236 In other words,
victims do not have to wait until the operators have paid the retrospective
premiums. It is the regulatory authority who advances the compensation
in the second layer ($6.7 billion) and collects this from the operators. In
total, if an accident had taken place in 2007, the $7 billion of damage
would be paid by the operators in the manner described in Table 5.
TABLE 5: EXAMPLE U.S.
Contributor
Year Operator Collectivity Total
(104 operators x
$15 million)
2007 $300 million $1.560 billion
2008 - $1.560 billion
2009 - $1.560 billion
2010 - $1.560 billion
2011 - $460 million
Total $300 million + $6.7 billion $7 billion
If the same accident were to take place in Europe, causing $7
billion (64.4 billion) in damages, one would again have to take into account
the legislation of the country. The total available amount in Belgium would
be E429 million: F300 million third-party liability and -129 million of the
third tier of the Brussels Supplementary Convention (total = $682 million;
third-party liability = $477 million; third tier = $205 million). 7 In France,
about p350 million ($556 million) would be available of which -E90 million
($143 million) would come from the nuclear operator's liability insur-
ance.23 This implies that in Belgium, an amount of E3.97 billion ($6.3
billion), and in France an amount of E4.05 billion ($6.43 billion), would
remain uncompensated. If the nuclear liability conventions of the second
238 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 232-33.
2 Id. and accompanying text.
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generation would be in force, a higher amount would be available-the
difference between the total amount of damage and the total amount
available under the revised Brussels Supplementary Convention.239 But
still, e2.9 billion ($4.6 billion) would remain uncompensated.
Finally, let us briefly address the impact of the already mentioned
CSC-the first nuclear liability convention adhered to by the United States.
As we already mentioned, the CSC may be important since it provides for
a second layer of 300 million SDR. 24 ° The CSC is a third layer of coverage
in addition to the U.S. operator's liability of $300 million and the second
layer of collective liability paid through retrospective premiums of $10.461
million.241 This may lead to an additional amount of victim compensation
on top of the already available $10.7 billion available. If the CSC were in
force today, the total available amount in the U.S. would be $10.7 billion
plus 300 million SDR ($493.083 million). This contribution covers the
"costs resulting from a covered incident outside the United States that is
not a Price-Anderson incident."242 The 2007 Act requires the suppliers of
nuclear energy to pay also this third layer of compensation under the
CSC.243 This convention has, however, not entered into force yet.24" How
much precisely the nuclear operators will have to contribute to this third
layer will also depend upon who the other contributors to the CSC are.24
As already indicated, the contribution of the U.S. in the second tier of CSC
will vary between roughly 40 and 100 million SDRs ($ 65.332 and 164.361
million).246 The nuclear suppliers in the U.S. are now considering estab-
lishing a captive insurance company in order to pay for their contribution
under the CSC.
247
239 Nuclear Energy Agency, 2004 Protocol to Amend the Brussels Supplementary
Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, http://www.nea.fr/html/law/brussels-
supplementary-convention-protocol.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (noting the revised
Brussels Supplementary Convention would cover E1.5 billion).
2 0 See CSC, supra note 43, at art III(1)(a)(i).
See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
22 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934(e)(1), 121
Stat. 1492, 1744 (2007).
24 3 Id.
24 See supra note 145.
4 See supra note 144.246 Id.
27Cf Ben McRae, The Compensation Convention: Path to a Global Regime forDealing with
Legal Liability and Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 61 NucLEAR L. BuLL. 25,29 (2001)
(noting that the CSC allows countries to chose how they will fund their CSC contributions).
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V. THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
We will first discuss the key features of our economic analysis.
Next, we will look in more detail at the issues of cost internalization and
risk differentiation.
A. Key Features
From an economic perspective, the basic rule which should under-
lie a nuclear liability regime is rather straightforward. The legal regime
should provide incentives for nuclear operators to internalize their risk
costs in order to maximize prevention.24" The basic idea is that by exposing
nuclear operators to the full risk costs they are generating, an efficient
internalization of the nuclear risk can take place. Of course, this inter-
nalization can be reached through a variety of legal and economic tools.
For the nuclear sector, ex ante safety regulation plays a crucial role. Lia-
bility rules have an important function in complementing safety regula-
tion. However, on the basis of this straightforward economic analysis of
nuclear liability law, it is clear that a nuclear operator should be exposed
to the full costs his activity generates in order to provide optimal incen-
tives for prevention.249
From this simple rule follow a few equally simple rules as far as
the structure of the regime of nuclear liability is concerned. Nuclear oper-
ators should, in principle, be fully liable for the potential damage caused
by their activity. To the extent that compensation is provided through
another source, be it government or insurance, mechanisms should be put
in place that take into account the nuclear operators' preventive efforts.
In insurance, these are the well-known techniques. Assigning full liability
is known as risk exposure as a remedy to moral hazard.25 ° In case of gov-
ernment provided compensation, the financing should in principle be risk-
related such that a government fund is financed by risk-based premiums
paid by operators.25'
24 See Michael Faure, Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 29 LAw & POL'Y, 339, 342 (2007).
9 This follows from the standard economic analysis of tort law. See STEVEN M. SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (Harvard Univ. Press, 1987); Steven M. Shavell,
Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
250 Steven M. Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, Q. J. ECON. 541 (1979); see also
Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief, Remedies for Expanding Liability, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 681, 684 (1998).
25 For further reading on conditions for efficient functioning of compensation funds, see
Faure, supra note 248; Pelzer, supra note 13, at 39.
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As we will indicate below, the international nuclear compensation
regime has been heavily criticised in law and economics literature for not
respecting these general principles." 2 Prior to addressing the question
of to what extent a similar criticism applies to the U.S. Price-Anderson
Act, let us briefly address some of the principles of the nuclear liability
and compensation model which were discussed above,253 which to some
extent constitute the basis of the U.S. Price-Anderson regime as well.
The Price-Anderson Act is also based on the principle of the strict
liability of the nuclear operator.254 It is not hard to argue that, based on
the economic analysis of tort law, nuclear accidents are certainly activi-
ties which should be submitted to a strict liability rule. The reason is that
they can be considered a unilateral accident, that is an accident whereby
only the injurer can influence the accident risk.255 In this case, only a
strict liability rule provides an incentive to the injurer not only to adopt
an efficient care level, but also to adopt an efficient activity level.256 This
is also a way to minimize the total expected accident costs the operator
has to bear.257 An important condition for a strict liability rule to be effi-
cient, however, is that the amount of compensation to be paid to the victim
should be equal to the actual damage caused by the operator.258 That
may be a problem when, like in the nuclear liability case, the potential
damage can be of a much higher magnitude than the individual wealth
of the operator. In case of such an insolvency problem, a strict liability rule
may lead to underdeterrence. 259 This so-called "judgment proof problem"
has been advanced in the literature as an important argument in favor
of imposing a duty on the operator to provide financial guarantees, for
example, in the form of compulsory insurance. 6 ° Therefore, the fact that
2 See Michael G. Faure & Roger Van den Bergh, Liability for NuclearAccidents in Belgium
from an Interest Group Perspective, 10 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 241 (1990); Faure & Skogh,
supra note 12; Faure, supra note 53; Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 10.
See supra Part I.B.
See Donald E. Jose & Michael A. Garza, The Price-Anderson Public Liability Action
And Strict Liability 4 (bepress Legal Series, Paper 2022, 2007), available at http://law
.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=9586&context=expresso.
255 See Shavell, supra note 249.
2
- Id. at 2-6.
257 Id.
258 See id.
259 Steven M. Shavell, The Judgment ProofProblem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45,54 (1986).
21 Id.; see G~ran Skogh, Mandatory Insurance: Transaction Costs Analysis of Insurance
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS, VOLUME II: CIVIL LAW & ECONOMICS 521 (B.
Bouckaert & G. De Geest eds., 2000), available at httpJ/encyclo.findlaw.com/tablebib.html;
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the Price-Anderson Act introduced compulsory insurance for the liability
of the individual operator of $300 million makes sense.
A second condition for strict liability to be efficient is that the nu-
clear operator be fully exposed to the damage that may be caused through
his activity.26' This economic principle may conflict with the limit on com-
pensation found in both the international regime, and the Price-Anderson
Act. Below, we will examine to what extent the limit on compensation in
the Price-Anderson Act creates inefficiencies. It should finally be men-
tioned, however, that an important difference between the international
regime and the Price-Anderson Act is that in the Price-Anderson Act there
is no legal channelling of liability to the licensee of a n uclear plant.2 62 This
channelling of liability has been criticized in economic and legal literature
because it excludes from liability all other parties who could have contrib-
uted to the loss as well and whose incentives, as a result of the exclusive
channelling of liability to the nuclear operator, will remain unaffected.263
The major reason for adopting legal channelling in the international conven-
tions was to shield U.S. suppliers from liability.264 A study written under
the auspices of Harvard Law School and the U.S. Atomic Industrial Forum
concluded that the easiest solution to protect suppliers was to abolish any
causes of action in tort against suppliers by channelling all third-party
tort suits to operators.265 Beyond that, the "advantages" of legal channel-
ling are, in our view, rather limited. Basically, legal channelling limits
potential problems arising from the concurrence of lawsuits,266 which is
economically beneficial because it decreases administrative costs. But grant-
ing victims the possibility of suing different persons for a given damage
offers far greater economic benefits in terms of prevention and compen-
sation of victims. It is indeed highly questionable whether the marginal
benefits of legal channelling, limiting the concurrence of lawsuits and there-
fore the administrative costs, outweigh the economic costs-limitation
Michael G. Faure, Economic Criteria for Compulsory Insurance, 31 THE GENEVA PAPERS
ON RISK AND INSURANCE 149 (2006); P.J. Jost, Limited Liability and the Requirement to
Purchase Insurance, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 259 (1996); Mattias Polborn, Mandatory
Insurance and the Judgment Proof Problem, 18 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 141 (1998).
21 See Shavell, supra note 259, at 47, 55.
262 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
21 See Faure, supra note 53, at 28.
64 See Vanden Borre, supra note 103, at 28.
m INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS OF FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST NUCLEAR RISK: A STUDY
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND ATOMIC INDUSTRIAL FORUM, INC. 58-
59 (Harvard Law School & Atomic Industrial Forum 1959).
21 See Vanden Borre, supra note 103, at 27-30.
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of lawsuits and lower incentives for potential injurers. A similar reduction
of tertiary accident costs is obtained in the U.S., thanks to the omnibus
coverage of the nuclear operator.267 The Price-Anderson Act has a system
of economic channelling which means that claims against third parties
remain possible, but the operator of the nuclear installation has the legal
obligation to include all those into the coverage under his nuclear liability
insurance.268 Therefore, we can also conclude that economic channelling
can contribute to the limitation of tertiary accident costs and, consequently,
that the U.S. Price-Anderson Act is more efficient than the international
nuclear liability compensation scheme.
We will now address more closely to what extent the Price-Anderson
Act enables the economic rules of thumb of cost internalization and risk
differentiation.
B. Cost Internalization: Then and Now
The economic principle of cost internalization as a remedy to market
failure caused by externalities requires the nuclear operator's full exposure
to the nuclear damages. If a financial cap would be put on his liability, or
if a part of the compensation would be paid by the state, this would effec-
tively create a subsidy to the nuclear industry.269 Originally, the Price-
Anderson regime definitely suffered from this problem. The nuclear oper-
ator in 1957 was only liable for $60 million, whereas the government agreed
to make an additional amount of $500 million available.2 V° At that time,
there was a clear subsidy to the nuclear energy production and a lack of
internalization of the costs caused by a nuclear accident. Even the NRC
argued that the Price-Anderson Act provided a real subsidy to the indus-
try, though its magnitude was difficult to estimate.27' Dubin and Rothwell
estimated the cumulative value of the subsidy to industry (in 1985 dollars)
to be $111 billion by 1988 and growing to $131 billion by 2001.272 Later
267 See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
268 See Pelzer, supra note 63.
269 For a calculation of the extent of this subsidy, see KARINE FIORE, THE NUCLEAR LIABILm
LIMrr IN THE OECD CONVENTIONS 1 (2007), available at http://www.aee-france.fr/aeese/
aeese-evePx papier_2007/prix_AEESE_2007KFiorenuclear.pdf.
270 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
271 See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT-THE THIRD
DECADE (NUREG-0957) G-12 (1983).
272 Jeffrey Dubin & Geoffrey Rothwell, Subsidy to Nuclear Power Through Price-Anderson
Liability Limit, 8 CONTEMP. ECON. POLY 73, 76 (1990). But see Anthony Heyes & Catherine
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Rothwell argued that, in economic terms, it is not a direct subsidy in the
sense that there is no direct payment made by government to anyone; at
the same time, he argues that there is a "potential (or expected) subsidy."273
This subsidy may artificially increase the competitiveness of nuclear energy
as compared to other energy sources, and may potentially have a negative
impact on prevention 4.2 " As we stated above, the Price-Anderson Act has
been revised many times, taking into account inter alia the possibilities
for the operator to obtain coverage on the insurance market. Today, the
U.S. nuclear operator is individually liable for $300 million and in the
second layer, an additional amount is available of $10.461 billion, making
the total amount available $10.761 billion.15 Whether the current sys-
tem leads to an efficient internalization of the costs of a potential nuclear
accident in the U.S. cannot be easily answered, because there are several
aspects to consider.
The first question that arises is whether the total available amount
in case of a nuclear incident in the U.S. today ($10.76 billion) will be suffi-
cient to cover the costs of an average nuclear incident. That depends to
a large extent on the estimates of the costs of a nuclear accident. In the
literature, various scenarios are described, whereby the damages range
from $10 billion to $100 billion.276 Depending upon the scenario one fol-
lows, there could potentially still be accidents for which the damage is
substantially higher than the compensation available today in the Price-
Anderson regime.277 Before the recent change in 2005, which brought the
total compensation available to $10.761 billion, the literature concluded
that there was indeed a subsidy resulting from the financial limit on the
Liston-Heyes, Subsidy to NuclearPower Through Price-Anderson Liability Limit: Comment,
16 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 122-24 (1998) (arguing that Dubin & Rothwell overstate the
subsidy by at least a factor of four).
27 Geoffrey Rothwell, Does the US Subsidize Nuclear Power Insurance?, POLICY BRIEF,
STANFORD INST. FOR ECON. POL' RES., Jan. 2002, available at http://siepr.stanford.edul
papers/briefs/policybrief jan02.pdf.
274 For a more detailed analysis of the consequences of the subsidy resulting from the
financial limit on liability, see Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, An Economic Analysis
of the French Nuclear Liability Subsidy (Centre d'Analyse Economique Aix-Marseille,
Working Paper, DR35, 2006).
275 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
276 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES, NUCLEAR REGULATION: A PERSPECTIVE ON LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR
NuCLEAR ACCIDENT 18 (1987), available at httpJ/archive.gao.gov/d28t5/133093.pdff Dubin
& Rothwell, supra note 272, at 73-79; Heyes & Liston-Heyes, supra note 272, at 122-24.
277 Id.
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liability of the operator in the Price-Anderson Act,27 but depending upon
the scenarios, this may still be the case today.
The second crucial question is whether under the current regime
all those who contribute to the nuclear risk-note these are not only
nuclear operators, but also suppliers of nuclear material and potentially
others-are exposed to the risk to the full extent. As such, there is still
a financial cap on the liability of the individual operator of $300 million.
This amount is clearly lower than the average costs of a nuclear acci-
dent.27 However, there is an additional amount of $10.461 billion avail-
able through the second layer, financed through retrospective premiums
by the collectivity of all nuclear operators. Disregarding, for a moment,
the fact that this amount may, as just mentioned, still be lower than the
costs of an average nuclear accident, let us address whether the fact that
it is not the individual operator, but the collectivity of operators that pay
the second layer, negatively affects the cost internalization. That should,
of course, not necessarily be the case. The fact that the second layer shifts
a part of the risk costs of the nuclear accident to the collectivity of nuclear
operators does not necessarily mean that there would be no cost inter-
nalization. The conclusion would be the same if the second layer would
not be paid through the collectivity of nuclear operators but, say, through
insurance. Whether costs are still efficiently internalized, in the sense that
adequate incentives are provided to individual operators, will depend on
the question of whether operators will have to contribute to the collective
layer according to the risk they pose and, accordingly, whether there is
some risk differentiation. This question will be addressed below.
So far we have indicated that the Price-Anderson Act may still pro-
vide incentives for cost internalization to nuclear operators, in a first layer
through their insurance based individual liability up to $300 million and
in the second layer through their contributions of the collectivity. The
third question arises, however, as to how this system also provides incen-
tives for an efficient cost internalization by parties other than nuclear
operators who could equally influence the nuclear risk. One can, for ex-
ample, think about suppliers of nuclear material. In this respect, it should
first be repeated that under the Price-Anderson Act, there is no legal
27 See Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation?-The
Sixty-Three Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1989).
279 See id. For that reason the Price-Anderson Act has also been criticized in U.S. legal
circles for providing too few incentives for accident prevention as a result of this financial
limit. Id. at 48-58.
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channelling to, or exclusive liability of, the nuclear operator.28 ° Others
who would have contributed to a nuclear accident are therefore still fully
exposed to liability.28 ' This liability can be called on either by potential
victims directly or through a recourse action exercised, for example, by the
insurer of the nuclear operator.8 2
Also, the U.S. has now implemented the CSC through the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, and the act stipulates that the
CSC will be financed by the nuclear suppliers.28 3 The argument is that
U.S. nuclear operators today face potentially unlimited liability for nuclear
accidents. The CSC's implementation forces U.S. nuclear suppliers to partic-
ipate in a retrospective risk pooling program to cover the costs following
from the U.S. contribution to the CSC, as far as accidents outside the U.S.
are concerned. 284 Therefore, the additional compensation under the CSC,
of 300 million SDRs, will be financed through contributions from U.S.
nuclear suppliers. However, the obligation to participate in the retrospec-
tive risk pooling program shall be deferred until the U.S. is called on to
provide funds pursuant to the CSC,28 5 in other words, until a covered inci-
dent has occurred. Of course, to the extent that the Energy Independence
and Security Act replaces the liability of the nuclear supplier through a
participation in the retrospective risk pooling program, a problem could
still arise if the participant's contribution would be less than the full risk
costs created. In that sense, a final judgment on whether the Energy
Independence and Security Act leads to a full cost internalization for
nuclear suppliers remains hard to make.
Finally, in judging whether the Price-Anderson Act, combined with
the Energy Independence and Security Act implementing the CSC, pro-
vides adequate incentives for cost internalization one should remember
that both Acts principally replace the unlimited exposure to liability of
nuclear operators and suppliers by a system of limited liability with col-
lective funding through a retrospective risk pooling system.2 6 However,
the U.S. compensation system has-especially compared to its origins in
1957--dramatically changed, for today, unlike in the international regime,
s See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
See id.
12 See id.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text. The CSC is not yet in force. Supra note 48.
This is comparable to the way in which the second layer is financed under the Price-
Anderson Act.
See Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934(e)(2),
121 Stat. 1492, 1744 (2007).
' See id. §§ 934 (a)(1)(B), 934(e)(2).
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no public funds are provided to compensate for the damage caused by
nuclear accidents.28 Even though the NRC may advance compensation
to the victims, the total compensation due will finally be paid by either
operators under the Price-Anderson Act, or suppliers under the CSC
through the retrospective premiums."' The U.S. system can, in that
sense, not be criticized for the fact that it would provide a large subsidy
to the nuclear industry by providing public money to compensate poten-
tial accident victims. The only questions which remain are whether the
total amount of compensation available approximately equals the esti-
mated costs of an average nuclear accident, and whether the system which
has been put in place is sufficiently risk based so that it provides adequate
incentives for prevention.
C. Risk Differentiation
A final judgment on the efficiency of the U.S. nuclear compensation
system will depend on its ability to expose those who contribute to the
nuclear risk to the costs of their activity. Assuming for a moment that the
available amount today of $10.761 billion from the Price-Anderson Act
plus 300 million SDRs from the CSC for a nuclear accident outside the
U.S., equals the costs of an average nuclear accident, the question arises
to what extent the financing of the system is such that it is risk related.
The importance of this question from an economic perspective may be
obvious. If the operators' or suppliers' exposure to liability is replaced by
another compensation mechanism, the new mechanism should, in prin-
ciple, be financed in such a way that appropriate incentives for preven-
tion are still provided. In this respect, three different situations can be
distinguished.
The first layer of liability of the nuclear operator under the Price
Anderson Act is, since 2005, $300 million, which must be covered through
insurance. The insurance is provided through ANI, the U.S. nuclear insur-
ance pool."8 Even though ANI is effectively a monopolist, it has incentives
to optimize profits through a system of adequate risk differentiation,29 °
just as any commercial insurance company. Hence, it can be assumed that
287 See infra Part II.A.2.
See id.; infra Part II.C.
See American Nuclear Insurers, supra note 153.
o See Michael G. Faure & Karine Fiore, The Coverage of the NuclearRisk in Europe: Which
Alternative, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 288, 305 (2008) (describing the
incentives for risk-sharing pools to risk differentiate efficiently), available at http'I/www
.grjm.net/documents/carine-fiore/GPrisk-sharing-faurefiore_2008.pdf.
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ANI adopts premium policy conditions to the individual risk posed by
every installation and operator. This corresponds to the classic economic
outcome for insurance companies: to maximize profits insurers will adapt
policies to reflect the risk posed by the insured.29' A problem arises, how-
ever, in the fact that ANI is a monopolist.292 Empirical research has shown
that in monopolistic insurance markets, incentives for insurers to differen-
tiate risks are reduced as compared to competitive insurance markets.293
Thus, ANI has reduced incentives to optimally differentiate risks. How-
ever, since even a monopolist can raise profits by risk differentiation, it
can be assumed that ANI, at least to some extent, practices risk differen-
tiation. Information provided to us by ANI shows that ANI does indeed
differentiate among risks. They employ several factors (e.g., location, reac-
tor type, MWT capacity) in developing premiums.2 94 The most relevant
is the so-called Engineering Rating Factor ("ERF"), which looks at indi-
vidual reactor performance based on twelve separate areas that are con-
sidered indicators of insurance risk.29 ANI subsequently assigns an ERF
to each operating power reactors. The ERF can lead to a 20% credit or
a 30% debit on premiums.296
The second and probably most exciting layer constitutes the
$10.461 billion to be financed by the collectivity of the 104 active U.S.
nuclear operators. These retrospective premiums are linked to the size
and number of the nuclear reactors being operated by each licensee.2 9 It
is therefore not merely a fixed amount for every licensee. The more reac-
tors one licensee has operating, the higher the amount of the retrospective
premium. 9' A few questions can be asked concerning this retrospectivepremium.
291 See, e.g., Katherine Taylor Eubank, Paying the Costs of Hazardous Waste Pollution: Why
is the Insurance Industry Raising Such a Stink, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 191-92 (1991).
292 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
13 For a summary of this literature, see Michael G. Faure & Roger Van Den Bergh,
Competition on the European Market for Liability Insurance and Efficient Accident Law,
9 MASTmicHT J. EuR. & Comp. L. 279 (2002).
294 E-mail from John Hoffman, Director of Underwriting, American Nuclear Insurers, to
Tom Vanden Borre (Dec. 20, 2007, 21:07 EST) (on file with author).
295 Id.
296 Id.
27 See Price-Anderson Hearing, supra note 110.
For example, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. owns or operates eleven (11) reactors
in the United States, while Ameren UE owns or operates only one (1). U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, List of Power Reactor Units, http'//www.nrc.gov/reactors
operating/list-power-reactor-units.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2008). The retrospective
premiums for Entergy are likely to be much higher than those for Ameren.
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First, it is striking that for the second layer of liability coverage,
no ex ante amounts have to be paid as if there were an insurance system,
only retrospective premiums.299 The major advantage from a financial per-
spective is that as long as no accident happens, the amounts do not have
to be paid, no reserves must be made, and capital is not unnecessarily im-
mobilized. 00 The NRC pre-finances the compensation to the victim and
subsequently collects the retrospective premiums from the licensees, each
paying a share based on the number of reactors it owns of the 104 reactors
operating.3 ' The only disadvantage of the system is that the insolvency
risk is shifted first to the NRC and then to the collectivity of operators.
It is unclear how seriously one should consider this insolvency risk. On
the one hand, there are many techniques which force operators to provide
guarantees for the payment of the retrospective premium in the second
layer. For example, the operator should provide a bond to the ANI guar-
anteeing payment of the retrospective premium.30 2 However, this may
just be a paper operation in practice if it is not supported by collateral
or financial securities to back up this financial obligation. We indicated
that in some cases ANI would require limited liability companies to pro-
vide letters of guarantee from parents or affiliated companies, which could
provide some proof of payment.30 3
On the other hand, the amount each operator potentially has to pro-
vide in the second layer is substantial, totalling at least $95.8 million,30 4
which could result in at least one of the 104 operators becoming insolvent.
However, in that case, the NRC can collect the remaining amount from
other operators, while still limiting the liability for each operator to $95.8
million.305 To the extent that the damage is below the limit, this may pro-
vide some incentives for operators to monitor each others' solvency. One
has to realize, though, that the viability of the Price-Anderson regime de-
pends upon whether, in case of a major accident, operators will effectively
be able to finance the second layer through retrospective premiums. Inter-
estingly, when the General Accounting Office ("GAO") allowed the NRC
to review and comment on the GAO's draft report regarding the NRC's
liability insurance requirements, the NRC commented on April 29, 2004
299 See Pelzer, supra note 13, at 43.
300 Id.
301 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
12 See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
303 id.
31 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
311 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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that, "[flinally, GAO agrees with NRC's conclusion that all its reactor
licensees have sufficient assets that they are likely to be able to pay the
retrospective premiums." °6 However, in a reaction, the GAO immediately
argued that "the report does not take a position on the licensee's ability to
pay the retrospective premiums[;] [w] e did not evaluate the sufficiency of
the individual licensee's as such to make these payments."3 °7 Whether the
licensees will be able to pay these retrospective premiums thus remains
an unresolved issue.
The retrospective premium has been fixed by regulation. 3 8 This
only concerns the amount which has to be paid by each operator per year,
which since 2005 has been $15 million.0 9 Thus, through this regulatory
intervention, the financial risk for the operator can be limited to $15 mil-
lion annually. Also, the total financial risk for all operators in this second
layer is limited to $10.461 billion, which means for each of the 104 operat-
ing power plants, $100.59 million.310
The amounts of the contribution in retrospective premiums are,
in principle, the same for every nuclear operator. 1' Hence, at first blush,
one could criticize the financing of the second layer because it lacks any
element of risk differentiation. However, this statement should be bal-
anced. First, the retrospective premiums are a function of the number
of operating reactors. Since the risk created will first of all depend on the
number of reactors a licensee has, there is definitely an element of risk
differentiation. However, this seems of course rather limited since it is
clearly not only the number of reactors that may influence the risk, but
also other elements such as the technology used and safety programs
implemented, for example.312
Second, one should realize that the financing of the second layer
has effectively become the collective responsibility of all nuclear operators
in the United States. Therefore, there is a strong incentive for a mutual
monitoring since any low quality operation will lead to increased financial
exposure for the other operators.
It should also be mentioned that the financing of the second layer
via retrospective premiums corresponds with a prediction made in the
306 UNITED STATEs GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 171, at 21.
37 Id. at 10.
301 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
39 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
310 See id.
311 See id.
312 See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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law and economics literature, more particularly by Skogh.3 13 Skogh argued
that in those cases where probabilities are ex ante unknown or difficult
to measure, which will of course be the case with nuclear risk, a system
of mutual risk sharing has the major advantage that operators can agree
to mutually share in each others losses even if probabilities are ex ante
unknown.314 Indeed, in the U.S. system, no ex ante premium has to be
fixed, but losses can be shared ex post.315 The structure of this second
layer therefore seems to correspond with the point made in law and eco-
nomics literature that for this type of large losses where probabilities are
unknown, mutual risk sharing may be more effective than insurance
which requires ex ante information in order to fix premiums.316
Third, the recent Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
implementing the CSC, introduces a similar retrospective pooling system
funded by the U.S. nuclear suppliers to finance the U.S. contribution to
the CSC in the case of a foreign accident. 17 Section 934(e) of the Energy
Independence and Security Act provides that the nuclear supplier will
have to participate in a retrospective payment program."1 The contribu-
tion will be fixed according to a risk informed assessment formula.319 The
Energy Independence and Security Act provides that the Secretary shall,
by regulation, determine the risk-informed assessment formula for the
allocation among nuclear suppliers of the retrospective premium to be
paid.320 The contributions will be determined on the basis of the risk con-
tributed by each nuclear supplier.321 This shows that, in determining the
"' See Giran Skogh, Development Risks, Strict Liability, and the Insurability of Industrial
Hazards, 13 THE GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 247, 253-54 (1988).
1 4 Id. at 252-54.
315 Id.; see also Gdran Skogh, Insurance and the Institutional Economics of Financial
Intermediation, 16 THE GENEvA PAPERS ON RISK AND INSURANCE 59 (1991).
316 See Skogh, supra note 313; Skogh, supra note 315.
317 This contribution will, inter alia, depend upon who the other members of the CSC are,
as already indicated, the contribution of the U.S. in the second tier of CSC will vary be-
tween roughly 40 and 100 million SDRs ($65.332 and 164.361 million). See supra note 144.
31 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934(e)(1), 121
Stat. 1492, 1744 (2007).
319 See S. REP. No. 109-346, at 4 (2007).
320 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934(e)(2)(c), 121
Stat. 1492, 1744 (2007).
321 Id. It refers, inter alia, to the following elements to be taken into account: "the nature
and intended purpose of the goods and services supplied by each nuclear supplier...; the
quantity of the goods and services supplied by each nuclear supplier...; the hazards
associated with the supplied goods and services.. . "; and the hazards associated with
particular forms of transportation. Id. § 934(e)(2)(c)(i)(I)-(III).
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contribution of each nuclear supplier, a formula shall be developed which,
in principle, takes into account the particular risks constituted by each
nuclear supplier.
In sum, one can notice that in the U.S. nuclear compensation
system risks are, to an important extent, shifted from individual nuclear
operators or suppliers to third parties-either insurers or the collectivity
of operators and/or suppliers. At the same time, one notices that in the
Energy Independence and Security Act implementing the CSC, the amount
an operator or supplier contributes to the particular compensation system
is determined on the basis of the risk constituted by the particular operator
or supplier.322 This seems to a large extent to correspond with the lesson
from the law and economics literature that if liability is moved away from
a potential injurer via insurance or another compensation mechanism,
alternative techniques, such as risk differentiation, must be used to pro-
vide potential injurers with sufficient incentives for prevention. One should
bear in mind, however, that the system's ability to effectuate cost inter-
nalization depends upon the assumption that the amount currently avail-
able would be sufficient to cover the costs of an accident. Whether the
funds available will cover the cost of an accident depends on the damage
assessment estimate used. Also, we must reiterate that the new retrospec-
tive pooling program to implement the CSC system will only apply to dam-
age caused by a nuclear accident outside the United States.323 Thus, for
nuclear accidents in the U.S., the situation remains unchanged.
Finally, we should formulate a few observations concerning the
mutual nuclear insurance scheme in the U.S. under NEIL. NEIL is in
fact a risk sharing agreement between operators, and not a commercial
insurance company.324 In the economic literature it has often been ad-
vanced that these type of risk sharing agreements by operators may
create better results than commercial liability insurance for the simple
reason that the information needed to exercise an adequate risk differen-
tiation to monitor moral hazard may be much more available among the
operators themselves than between operators and insurers. 32 This corre-
sponds with the idea that through collective risk sharing via a pool, the
pool will have excellent incentives for a mutual monitoring.326 Indeed, if
322 See S. REP. No. 109-346, supra note 319, at 5.
3' Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 934(e)(1), 121
Stat. 1492, 1744 (2007).31 See Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited supra note 192.325 See Skogh, supra note 313; Skogh, supra note 315.
321 See Faure & Skogh, supra note 12; supra note 316 and accompanying text.
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one operator would for example have a substandard plant3 27 this would
immediately increase the financial exposure of the other operators. Thus,
the mutual monitoring via the pool should exclude bad risks or lead to
a risk differentiation whereby contributions to the captive are linked to
the risk constituted.
As mentioned, NEIL only offers first-party insurance coverage.32
This might seem strange. But, as is especially the case with catastrophic
liability risks being covered under a risk sharing agreement, the "regular"
insurance market is quite reluctant to insure those types of risks. Insur-
ance market reluctance will only increase after the entry into force of the
Protocol to the Paris Convention providing for a liability time limit of thirty
years for coverage of personal injury damage and ten years for all other
nuclear damage, including environmental harms.329 In this respect, it is
not surprising that a specific mutual scheme aiming at covering these
types of risk was created in Europe also--ELINI.33 °
VI. PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: A MODEL FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
REGIME?
A. Advantages of the Price-Anderson Model
We began in Section I by establishing the complicated legal history
of the international nuclear compensation regimes and compared this to
the U.S. compensation regime which, to some extent, has different fea-
tures than the international regime. Early literature has already criticized
the international regime from an economic perspective. 331' The criticism
was rather straightforward. The legal channelling of liability in the inter-
national conventions has the major disadvantage that many parties, other
than the nuclear operator, who could equally influence the risk of a nuclear
accident are not exposed to liability. 3 2 Also, the financial limit on the lia-
bility of the licensee of the nuclear plant remains too low, which, in com-
bination with the large public funds made available in the international
327 Which would already be difficult given the heavy regulatory controls. See supra notes
25, 171 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 203 and accompanying text.329 See Protocol to Amend Paris Convention, supra note 76, at art. I.
330 See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
' See sources cited supra note 252.332 See Trebilcock & Winter, supra note 10.
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regime, leads to a substantial subsidization of nuclear energy, and thus
to an insufficient cost internalization.333
Even though we have indicated that it is hard to make a final,
positive judgement on the U.S. compensation regime given the fact that
the real costs of a nuclear damage can still be higher than the compensa-
tion available, the U.S. regime seems in many respects to be more in line
with the law and economics literature with respect to nuclear liability.
A first advantage of the U.S. regime is that it seems far more
dynamic than the international regime. The Price-Anderson Act started
in 1957 with a relatively low financial limit-$60 million-on the liability
of the operator, but a large amount of government intervention-$500 mil-
lion. But by 1975, the Price-Anderson Act already provided for a dynamic
system whereby the relationship between private and public funding could
change, taking into account inter alia developments in the insurance
market. 4 The fact the Price-Anderson Act organized insurers at the fed-
eral level, and not at the state level as most U.S. insurance markets, 335 the
U.S. nuclear insurance market could create substantially higher amounts
of compensation. Today, the coverage of the nuclear risk in Europe still
takes place via the nuclear insurance pools, which are organized at a
national, member state level, and therefore, not surprisingly, have gener-
ated amounts of insurance coverage that are too low.3 36 The U.S. federal
government has systematically removed itself from covering the nuclear
risk such that by 1982 the $560 million of required compensation was
entirely financed by private funds.3 7
It is very striking that in the beginning, the international regime
and the American nuclear compensation scheme were very similar, but
today the differences between the two systems are quite spectacular.
Today, in the U.S., the total amount of compensation available is $10.761
billion, of which $300 million is financed through the individual liability
of the nuclear operator and $10.461 billion through the collective respon-
sibility of all operators financed through retrospective premiums. Today,
the NEA regime requires a total amount of available compensation of 300
million SDRs (roughly E310.35 million; $493.08 million).338 Once the
3 1 See, e.g., Faure & Fiore, supra note 274; FIORE, supra note 269.
334 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 24 (2008) ("Insurance company regulation is matter which
is traditionally left to states. . .
"
6 See supra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
3 7 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
'
3 See supra note 33.
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Protocols to the Paris and Brussels Supplementary Conventions enter
into force, the total amount of compensation available will be 41.5 billion
($2.383 billion), of which 4700 million ($1.112 billion) will be financed by
the nuclear operator and 4800 million ($1.271 billion) by public funds. 39
Of course, the Contracting Parties have the freedom to charge the cost of
their obligation to the nuclear operators and thus, indirectly contributing
to more internalisation.' But even if the Contracting Parties were to do
so, thereby imposing a liability limit of 41.2 billion ($1.907 billion), a part
of the damage would still be paid by public funds. Unless all Contracting
Parties opt for unlimited liability of the nuclear operator, no one will be
liable for damage in excess of 4.1.5 billion ($2.383 billion).
The conclusion, therefore, is rather straightforward. The economic
goal of cost internalization can hardly be reached in the international
regime for two main reasons. In the NEA regime, the individual liability
of the nuclear operator seems at first blush high-700 million ($1.112
billion) compared to $300 million in the U.S. Price-Anderson Act-but
is only a small fraction of the potential costs of a nuclear accident, esti-
mating the damage to be between $10 billion and $100 billion.34' Second,
the second layer of compensation in the international regime is entirely
provided through public funds34 2 whereby no risk related financing takes
place whatsoever. The second and third layer of public funds in the NEA
regime and the second layer under CSC are a pure subsidy to the nuclear
industry and contribute nothing to cost internalization.343 This criticism
can be partially addressed if the Contracting Parties charge the operators
for the costs of making public money available. However, these costs should
be market reflective and should take into account risk differentiation, as
discussed. It is far from certain that any governmental institution is well
equipped enough to assume this difficult task, let alone in a more efficient
manner than an insurance company or mutual insurance scheme.
On the other hand, in the U.S. the second layer is not only consid-
erably higher than in the international regime ($10.461 billion compared
to C800 million, $1.271 billion, in the NEA regime), but it is also financed
through the collectivity of the nuclear operators and hence contributes
... See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
uo Id.
41 See sources cited supra note 276. This is also the case in the IAEA regime, where the
revised liability amount is 300 million SDRs ($493.083 million). See International Atomic
Energy Agency, supra note 42.
4 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text. As far as the NEA regime is concerned:
the second layer by the installation state and a collective state fund in the third layer. Id.
' See sources cited supra notes 12, 53 and accompanying text.
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to a cost internalization. 3" The situation is, moreover, only worse if one
compares the Price-Anderson Act with the regime under the Vienna
Convention where the amounts are even dramatically lower than in the
NEA regime.34 An important feature of the U.S. regime is that, indeed,
a system has been developed whereby the second layer of compensation
does not merely consist of public funding, but is the collective responsi-
bility of industry. The task of the government in this respect is limited
to pre-financing the compensation to the victim and collecting the retro-
spective premiums from the operators.346 Moreover, in order to limit the
risk exposure of the operators, the annual retrospective premiums are
determined by law. However, in the end, it is the nuclear operators that
contribute to finance the second layer of $10.461 billion through these
retrospective premiums.
The retrospective nature of the premium does create a potentially
important insolvency risk. This can, to some extent, be mitigated through
other controls on the solvency of operators and via the mutual monitoring
inherent in financing the second layer through an industry run mutual,
or, as ANI does, by asking guarantees of affiliated companies.347 A poten-
tial danger of relying on retrospective premiums is indeed the insolvency
risk. The advantage is, however, that no ex ante assessment of probabili-
ties is necessary and no capital needs to be immobilized ex ante.3" A simi-
lar system has been worked out for financing the U.S. contribution to the
CSC through risk dependant retrospective premiums to be paid by nuclear
suppliers.
The last important difference between the U.S. and the interna-
tional regime is that the U.S. regime has no legal channelling of liability
to operators. The U.S. implementation of the CSC furthers this trend by
explicitly involving nuclear suppliers in the financing of nuclear risk, as
far as nuclear accidents outside the U.S. are concerned. 349 The interna-
tional regime, on the contrary, inefficiently excludes liability of all others
than the licensee who could have contributed to the risk.35 °
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Table 3.
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
347 See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
3 See Pelzer, supra note 13, at 48. A system of pooling with retrospective premiums can
therefore also be more advantageous than the payment of insurance premiums which is
basically considered "lost money." Id.
9 See Vanden Borre, supra note 40, at 27.3 1 See id.
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The lesson seems, therefore, to be rather clear: the U.S. Price-
Anderson Act and its recent amendments seem to have understood and
incorporated the lessons from economic analysis. The various parties who
contribute to nuclear risk are exposed to substantial amounts of liability
which may provide incentives for prevention and cost internalization. Eco-
nomic literature had already often suggested that the international regime
should be changed to expose more fully those creating the nuclear risk to
the costs of their activity. Within a regime where insurance is only pro-
vided through nationally operating insurance pools within member states,
forcing nuclear suppliers to internalize costs remains difficult. The U.S.
model demonstrates that if a compensation regime were to be organized
as a collective responsibility of the nuclear industry, thereby excluding
public funding, much higher amounts of compensation can be provided to
victims, and a better internalization of the nuclear risk can be promoted.35'
This, however, presupposes cooperation between nuclear operators which
currently fall under the international regime, and also assumes there
are possibilities of a mutual monitoring which is essential in a system of
collective responsibility, such as under the Price-Anderson Act. Perhaps
socio-economic or institutional impediments have thus far prevented the
creation of a similar risk sharing agreement among nuclear operators in
Europe. Pelzer noted that during the negotiations to revise the Vienna
Convention, experts discussed the international pooling of operators' funds,
but such suggestions did not find support and eventually failed."2 Pelzer
argued that using private operators' money in one country to meet the
obligations of operators in other countries was unfeasible because "[t]here
is no universal risk community of operators. " '
Two important factors facilitated cooperation with the U.S. nuclear
industry. First, all operators are subject to a single federal regulator, the
NRC.354 In the case of Europe, each country has its own regulatory struc-
ture not only on nuclear safety, but also on the approval of the form of
financial security to be presented by the nuclear operator. 5 On top of
that, and despite several EU Directives on nuclear safety focusing more
.51 Pelzer recently concluded that the Price-Anderson compensation system,"perfectly
complements the capacity of private insurance industry in a most cost-effective way."
Pelzer, supra note 13, at 43.3 52 Id. at 45.
3
-Id. at 45-46.
"
5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, About NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2008).355 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
20081 279
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
on issues concerning radiation protection and less on operational safety
issues, there are differences in the way nuclear power plants are being
operated throughout Europe. 56 With this in mind, nuclear operators can
take the view that differences in those safety issues create market distor-
tions impeding closer cooperation. However, it is our view that a cross-
border cooperation between European nuclear operators within a mutual
insurance scheme will decrease differences and enhance overall nuclear
safety. Indeed, under the existing mutual insurance schemes, the opera-
tors send inspectors to the installations.3 7 Also, a difference in premium is
operated depending on factors such as location of the plant (as in whether
it is near a large city), age of the plant, and ERF.358 Third, one has to bear
in mind that today the market in Europe is quite concentrated in terms
of the number of nuclear power plants per operator, e.g., in France, the
state-owned Electricit6 de France ("EDF") operates fifty nine nuclear
power plants.359
B. Feasibility of the Price-Anderson Model at an International
Level
Given the fact that our analysis indicated that the American
nuclear liability and insurance system is superior to the international
system,36° the adoption of the American model internationally should be
envisaged. 361' The key issue in such a model is to phase-out all state fund-
ing in the international, and of course national, nuclear compensation
schemes.362 In other words, the issue is the replacement of the current
collective state funding with a collective tier funded by nuclear operators.
311 See, e.g., Amended Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) Laying down Basic
Obligations and General Principles on the Safety of Nuclear Installations & Amended
Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) on the Safe Management of the Spent Nuclear
Fuel and Radioactive Waste, COM (2004) 526 final (Aug. 9, 2004).
367 See, e.g., Preface to NUCLEAR POOLS' FORUM, INTERNATIONAL GuIDELINES FOR
MACHINERY BREAKDOWN PREVENTION AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (American Nuclear
Insurers 2000) (describing the Guidelines "as a document for the insurance inspector.").
"
30 See supra notes 294-96 and accompanying text.
... See World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in France, Aug. 2008, http://www
.world-nuclear.orglinfo/inf4O.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
o Our analysis focused on the NEA regime, but the same holds true for the IAEA regime.
30 Pelzer, supra note 13, at 49. Pelzer argues that a pooling mechanism can even be in
the interests of operators since it leads to higher coverage which can protect the operator
"against legal or political pressure to provide additional assets for compensation in excess
of the [limited] liability amount." Id.
" See id. at 46-55.
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Basically, Europe would thus follow the American example, more than
twenty five years later.
It should be possible to follow the U.S. example in Europe since
the U.S. is not the only country in the world to have a similar two-tier
system. In Germany, the liability of the nuclear operator is unlimited;363
there is, however, a limit to the security requirement, E2.5 billion ($3.972
billion),3 " of which E256 million ($406.733 million) is to be provided by
each plant's operator insurance.365 The other part is to be provided collec-
tively by the operators of all seventeen nuclear reactors.3 66 Hence, there
is some experience in Europe with a risk sharing pool among operators.
All nineteen German nuclear power plants concluded a so-called "soli-
darity agreement" whereby they accept liability towards the other
partners to contribute a certain percentage of the total amount due
based on a square root of the thermal reactor power.367 If a nuclear
accident occurs, the guarantee is due to be paid "provided neither the
operator nor the respective parent company are in a position to provide
the money necessary for the compensation .... "368
The funding of a Price-Anderson type regime at the international
level should not be too difficult because in nine Western European coun-
tries alone, there are 135 nuclear reactors in operation, which is more
than the current 104 reactors in the second tier of the U.S. compensation
system.36 s Vanden Borre notes that
[ilf all these operators should contribute [, for example,] or
[sic] 410 million [$15.888 million] in the second tier (one
tenth of the current amount of the second tier in the US),
an amount ofE 1.35 billion [$2.145 billion] of private fund-
ing would be immediately available in the second tier. It
even seems that there is nothing in the Protocol to amend
the Paris Convention that would oppose such a solution in
3' Gesetz uber die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie un den Schutz gegen ihre
Gefahren (Atomgesetz), Dec. 23, 1959, BGB1 1959, Aug. 29, 2008, BGB1. I at 1793.
364 Id. at § 13(3).
365 World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power in Germany, June 2008, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf43.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
3 Id.; Paul Dangelmaier, Nuclear Liability Insurance in the Federal Republic ofGermany,
in NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS: LIABILrrIEs AND GUARANTEES 425,428 (NEA-IAEA, 1992).
... See Pelzer, supra note 13, at 43-45.
Id. at 44.
3 9 For a discussion of the basic conditions to implement international pooling, see id. at
50-55.
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order to be able to cover the E700 million [$1.112 billion].
Indeed, according to the amended Art. 10, a) of the Paris
Convention, the operator shall, in order to cover the liabil-
ity under the Convention, be required to have and maintain
insurance or other financial security of such type and terms
as the competent public authority shall specify. Hence, such
a solution would require at least a co-ordinated approach
between the competent public authorities of the countries
involved.37 °
Pelzer argues that, unlike the Price-Anderson Act, an international pool-
ing system should preferably be introduced on a voluntary, rather than
a mandatory, basis.37' Making risk pooling mandatory, as does the Price-
Anderson Act, would cause legal problems in specific jurisdictions such
as Germany. There it could be argued that forcing operators to contribute
to cover compensation for an accident caused in another operator's reactor
would violate constitutional property rights. 372 He, therefore, strongly
suggests making a pooling model voluntary.
We are not convinced that these legal problems cannot be overcome
if the legislature can at least justify why in this specific case the pooling
through retrospective premiums must be introduced. A pooling model on
a voluntary basis can be difficult to create if there is not a convention be-
hind the operators to force them to pool. The voluntary nature would also
have the disadvantage that there would be little guarantee that money
would effectively be available to compensate victims after an accident, for
example if the private pooling arrangement was subsequently altered.
Therefore, we would prefer a mandatory participation in the pooling scheme
as in the model of the Price-Anderson Act.
The model we suggest is based on three assumptions. First, the
model is to be applied on a limited international basis-at least at the
onset of setting up such a model. The reason for this is quite simple:
such a model can only work if the operational safety of the participating
nuclear power plants is similar or at least comparable. Pooling has an
important effect on the prevention of nuclear accidents: those operators
wanting to participate in the pool will have an incentive to enhance the
safety of their power plants. Second, the model is conceived in such a
370 Vanden Borre, supra note 40, at 306-07.
371 Pelzer, supra note 13, at 49-50.
372 Id. at 49.
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way that enough funds will be available over a certain period of time, for
example, ten years. The funds of the second tier should only be gradually
available. Third, the model will only work if major regulatory issues have
been resolved. By far the most important regulatory issue is the creation
of a European independent regulatory body, a kind of European Nuclear
Regulatory Agency. This body will issue permits to nuclear installations
falling under the international nuclear liability regime and will determine
the way the operators will insure their liability.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Worldwide, a variety of differing regimes exist for the coverage of
damage caused by civil nuclear accidents. At the international level, two
different regimes developed: one from the OECD/NEA and the other from
the IAEA. What is striking is that the U.S. played an important role in
supporting the creation of these international regimes,373 but did not join
the regimes until very recently. Instead, the U.S. started its own regime
in 1957 with the Price-Anderson Act. A similar, separate legal develop-
ment can also be noticed in the area of damage caused by oil pollution.
The U.S. actively cooperated with the creation of the civil liability con-
vention for oil pollution and its subsequent changes, but did not join the
conventions.374 The U.S. instead created its own separate regime with the
Oil Pollution Act of 1970. 375
The attitude of the U.S. in the 1950s is easy to explain. Its primary
goal in supporting an international convention on civil nuclear liability
was to make sure that liability would be legally channelled to the licensee
of a nuclear plant, thus excluding the potential liability of U.S. suppliers
who provided nuclear material to European power plants. 76 Domestically,
however, the U.S. created the Price-Anderson Act in 1957 with a higher
compensation and without a legal channelling of liability.377
Since the end of the 1950s when the separate regimes were created,
much has changed, and particularly in recent years, some important
171 See Vanden Borre, supra note 40, at 262-66.
31 See Hui Wang, Shifts in Governance in the International Regime of Marine Oil
Pollution Compensation: A Legal History Perspective, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 199 (Michael Faure & Albert Verheij, eds., 2007).
375 Id.
376 Supra note 264. For a full discussion of the potential scope of the liability of suppliers,
see Arthur Murphy, Third Party Liability of Suppliers in International Nuclear Transactions,
in 3 LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 166-86 (J.L. Weinstein, ed., 1962).377 See supra Part II.A.1.
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changes to the regimes were adopted. The basic reasons for these recent
changes are clear: the international regime is recognizing that the under-
lying justifications for supporting nuclear power through publicly funded
liability regimes are no longer valid. The international nuclear compen-
sation regime in the conventions and the American compensation scheme
in the Price-Anderson Act began in the 1950s based on the idea that nu-
clear energy development had to be supported, which justified limiting
liability and making public funding available to provide compensation
to accident victims." 8 The U.S. realized that this justification was no
longer valid and, as a result, in 1982 the U.S. completely abandoned the
public funding of nuclear damage. The international regime today still,
to a large extent, relies on public funding. 79
In this paper we addressed the U.S. and international regimes from
an economic perspective, paying especially attention to the U.S. regime,
as earlier studies had already criticized the international regime from an
economic perspective.
The regimes show some similarities. For example, in both regimes
the nuclear operator's liability is strict and the operator must provide a
financial guarantee for the first layer of strict liability. Both strict liability,
given the unilateral character of nuclear accidents, and compulsory insur-
ance, given the insolvency risk, can be supported by economic analysis.
Economics, though, was always critical of both the financial limit on nu-
clear operator's liability the and the legal channelling of the liability to
the operator. This channeling takes the form of exclusive liability in the
international conventions, but is nonexistent in the Price-Anderson Act.
Of course, many have argued that the damages in case of a nuclear
accident can be of such a magnitude that traditional financial instruments
such as insurance may not be able to provide adequate coverage. However,
the Price-Anderson Act demonstrates that this is not necessarily a reason
to move to public funding as the international regimes do; a valuable alter-
native can consist of a second layer which is the collective responsibility
of all the operators, financed through retrospective premiums. The inter-
national regime's choices to limit the liability of the operator and to sub-
sidize victim compensation through public funding may have negative
consequences. To the extent that unlimited liability rules provide incen-
tives for prevention, the limitation of liability does create an incentive for
the externalization of costs, which may lead to underdeterrence. To some
extent nuclear operators will still have sufficient incentives because both
378 id.
379 See supra Part II.A.2.
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of safety regulation and from their own interest not to lose the investment
in the nuclear plant. As a result of the financial limit, however, the poten-
tial complementary function of liability rules in providing additional deter-
rence above the requirements set by safety regulation is lost. The limits on
liability in the international regimes also effectively create a subsidy for
nuclear power which may disturb the competitiveness of nuclear energy
compared to other energy sources which lack this subsidy. A relatively too
high demand will follow. It can be useful to bear this in mind in the debate
on climate change and the role of nuclear energy therein.
The deficiencies of the international nuclear compensation scheme
seem to be substantially less in the American regime since the total
amounts of compensation are substantially higher, equalling the costs of
a nuclear accident in an optimistic scenario, and are financed by the liable
operator in combination with the collectivity of operators, thus leading to
a better internalization of the nuclear risk. An open question is whether
the nuclear risk in the U.S. is effectively internalized in the prices paid for
nuclear energy. That would suppose that, nuclear operators already take
into account the fact that, in the future, they may be exposed to liabilities
to pay retrospective premiums. This foresight should be calculated into
the premiums which energy users pay today. Otherwise, today's prices of
nuclear energy in the U.S. remain too low and the costs of nuclear power
are shifted to future generations, who will have to pay higher prices to
finance the retrospective premiums. It is questionable whether such a full
internalization, also taking into account future retrospective premiums,
effectively takes place in U.S. energy prices today.
A disadvantage of the low limits, combined with the still low com-
pensation in the international regime, is also that victims may remain
largely uncompensated. This is quite worrisome, given the fact that many
countries, such as Finland and France, that are building new nuclear
power plants, rely on nuclear energy as a solution to the climate change
problem. That supposes adequate compensation is available in the un-
likely event of a nuclear accident. If this is not the case, a nuclear acci-
dent may have serious disruptive effects on the socio-economic situation
of the affected region.
The U.S. example gives us an important lesson for the interna-
tional regime. Through a mutual risk sharing by the nuclear industry on
the one hand, higher amounts of compensation for victims can be gener-
ated, and on the other hand, public funding can be reduced, as a result
of which a better internalization of the costs of a nuclear accident will
take place. Of course one point for further research is, as just mentioned,
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to what extent an effective internalization of the nuclear risk takes place
in the U.S. today, meaning that energy prices do already reflect the retro-
spective premiums that operators may have to pay to cover future liabilities.
Another question which merits further research is how a system of mutual
risk sharing could be worked out at the European level, for example, for
the European nuclear operators which are now under the scope of the
NEA Conventions. The question arises whether a similar model of mutual
risk sharing, either through ex ante reserves or through retrospective
premiums would also be feasible in Europe and what the precise financial
consequences of such a model would be.
Finally, the entire system also teaches a lesson on the relative
power of the nuclear interest groups in their lobbying efforts, and this
lesson is seen in both the U.S. and in Europe. From a U.S. perspective,
the international conventions protect the interests of the American sup-
pliers given the fact that the legal channelling protects-or is at least
aimed at protecting-them from being held liable for nuclear accidents in
Europe."o So, American policy has been twofold: protecting the interests
of the American nuclear suppliers abroad (via the legal channelling),
while at the same time phasing-out public funding for damage caused by
a domestic nuclear accident. As far as the legal channelling is concerned,
the result of the American policy does not achieve the goals of our eco-
nomic analysis. But as far as the Price-Anderson Act, in combination with
the success of the mutual insurance scheme (NEIL), is concerned, the out-
come is rather positive in terms of cost internalization and risk differen-
tiation. Nuclear operators in Europe have apparently been able to better
protect their interests as compared to their colleagues in the U.S., in the
sense that there is only cost internalization of some form to a very limited
extent. Even if, academically, one were to show that the NEA Conventions
could be modelled according to the Price-Anderson Act, this does not mean
that one can expect this to take place in the near future. Political reality
will probably teach that different stakeholders involved will put a lot of
effort in lobbying in order to maintain limited liability and state inter-
vention. Once more, public choice theory teaches that legislators will often
not follow the predictions of economic theory, but rather the demands of
powerful interest groups which provide support to wealth-maximizing
politicians.
o Also the recent implementation of the CSC by the U.S. should be seen in this light:
it replaces a potentially open-ended liability of nuclear suppliers with a predictable regime.
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